Theory and History of Ontology

website ontology logoeBook version

My other websites:

History of Logic

website logic logoeBook version 

Bibliographia

website bibliographia logoeBook version

Theory and History of Ontology by Raul Corazzon | e-mail: rc@ontology.co

 

Annotated bibliography on Franz Brentano: Studies in English, First Part: A - Bar

Bibliographical resources

  1. Paolo Gregoretti. 1983. Franz Brentano. Bibliografia completa (1862-1982), Trieste,:Università degli Studi.

    Contents: I. Works by Franz Brentano 7; II. translations 21; III. Studies on Brentano 25; Index of Authors 81-87.

  2. Wilhelm Baumgartner and F. P. Burkard. 1990. Franz Brentano Bibliographie in: International Bibliography of Austrian Philosophy 1982/83 - Internationale Bibliographie zur osterreichischen Philosophie - Compiled with assistance of Thomas Binder, Jutta Valent, Helmut Werba, Amsterdam: Rodopi.

    Contents: Teil I / Part I. 1. W. L. Gombocz: Vorwort 7; Literaturhinweis zur IBÖP / Bibliographical Notes 13; 2. Bildnis / Portrait: Franz Brentano 16; 3. W. Baumgartner, F.-P. Burkard: Franz Brentano. Eine Skizze seines Lebens und seiner Werke 17; 4. W. Baumgartner, F.-P. Burkard: Franz-Brentano-Bibliographie 54; 5. Hinweise für den Gebrauch der Bibliographie und register 161; 6. How to use Bibliography and Index 166-170.

  3. Liliana Albertazzi. 2006. Immanent Realism. An Introduction to Brentano, Dordrecht: Springer.

    Bibliographic notes pp. 341-354.

Bibliography

  1. "Die Philosophie Franz Brentano." 1978. Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 5.

    Special Issue. Contributions to the Brentano-Konferenz Graz, 4-8 September 1977 (Edited by Roderick Chisholm and Rudolf Haller).

    Studies in English: Edgar Morscher: Brentano and his place in Austrian philosophy 1; George Katkov: The world in which Brentano believed he lived 11; Burnham Terrell: Quantification and Brentano's logic 45; Dagfinn Føllesdal: Brentano and Husserl on intentional objects and perception 83; Herbert Spiegelberg: On the significance of the correspondence between Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl 95; Peter Geach: Intentionality of thought versus intentionality of desire 131; Elizabeth Anscombe: Will and emotion 139; Paul Weingartner: Brentano's criticism of the correspondence theory of truth and the principle "Ens et verum convertuntur" 183; Roderick M. Chisholm: Brentano's conception of substance and accident 197; Rolf George: Brentano's relation to Aristotle 249-266.

  2. "The Descriptive Psychology of the Brentano School." 1987. Topoi no. 6:1-64.

    Guest editors: Roderick Chisholm and Rudolf Haller.

    Contents: R. M. Chisholm and R. Haller: Introduction 1; Klaus Hedwig: Brentano's Hermeneutics 3; Stephan Körner: On Brentano's Objections to Kant's Theory of Knowledge 11; Heiner Rutte: On the Problem of Inner Perception 19; Peter M. Simons: Brentano's Reform of Logic 25; Barry Smith: The Substance of Brentano's Ontology 39; Enzo Melandri: The 'Analogia Entis' According to Franz Brentano: A Speculative-Grammatical Analysis of Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' 51; Roderick M. Chisholm: Brentano's Theory of Pleasure and Pain 59-64.

  3. "The School of Brentano and Husserlian Phenomenology." 2003. Studia Phaenomenologica no. 3.

    Contents: Ion Tănăsescu, Victor Popescu: Introduction 9; Wilhelm Baumgartner: Franz Brentano, "Grossvater" der Phänomenologie 15; Jocelyn Benoist: Quelques remarques sur la doctrine brentanienne de l'évidence 61; Ion Tanasescu: Ist die Empfindung intentional? Der Brentanosche Hintergrund einer Kritik Husserls 75; Klaus Hedwig: "Inseln des Unglücks". Die Stellung des Schlechten im Summationsprinzip der Güter. Aristoteles-Brentano-Katkov 99; Victor Popescu: Espace et mouvement chez Stumpf et Husserl. Une approche méréologique 115; Claudio Majolino: Le différend logique: jugement et énoncé. Eléments pour une reconstruction du débat entre Husserl et Marty 135; Dale Jacquette: Meinong on the Phenomenology of Assumption 155; Carlo Ierna: Husserl on the Infinite 179; Robin Rollinger: Husserl's Elementary Logic. The 1896 Lectures In Their Nineteenth Century Context 195; Bernhardt Waldenfels: Zwischen Sagen und Zeigen. Überlegungen zu Husserls Theorie der okkasionellen Ausdrücke 215; Bruce Bégout: Percevoir et juger. Le rôle de la croyance originelle (Urdoxa) dans la phénoménologie du jugement de Husserl 229-270.

  4. "Brentano's Concept of Intentionality. New Assessments." 2015. Brentano Studien no. 13.

    Edited by Guillaume Fréchette.

    Contents: Guillaume Fréchette: Introduction. Brentano’s Conception of Intentionality: New Facts and Unsettled Issues 9; Mauro Antonelli: Franz Brentano’s Intentionality Thesis. A New Objection to the “Nonsense that was Dreamt up and Attributed to him” 23; Carlo Ierna: Improper Intentions of ambiguous objects: Sketching a New Approach to Brentano’s Intentionality 55; Arkadiusz Chrudzimski: Intentional Objects and Mental Contents 81; Klaus Hedwig: „eine wesentliche Umbildung“. Über die Transformation der Intentionalität bei Brentano 121; Cyril McDonnell: Understanding and Assessing “Brentano’s Thesis” in Light of His Modification of the Scholastic Concept of Intentionality 153; Hamid Taieb: Relations and Intentionality in Brentano’s Last Texts 183; Ion Tănăsescu: The two Theories of Intentionality in Brentano and the Program of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint 211; Klaus Hedwig: Buchrezension: María del Carmen Paredes Martín, Teorías de la intencionalidad 233; Wilhelm Baumgartner: Buchrezension: Ion Tanasescu (Hg.), Franz Brentano’s Metaphysics and Psychology. Upon the sesquicentennial of Franz Brentano’s Dissertation 243-257.

  5. "Brentano." 2017. The Monist no. 100.

    Contents: Johannes L. Brandl: Was Brentano an Early Deflationist About Truth? 1; Anna Giustina: Conscious Unity from the Top Down: A Brentanian Approach 15; Olivier Massin and Marion Hämmerli: Is Purple a Red and Blue Chessboard? Brentano on Colour Mixtures 37; Michelle Montague: A Contemporary View of Brentano’s Theory of Emotion 64; Kevin Mulligan: Brentano’s Knowledge, Austrian Verificationisms, and Epistemic Accounts of Truth and Value 88; Jonas Olson: Two Kinds of Ethical Intuitionism: Brentano’s and Reid’s 106; Hamid Taieb: Intentionality and Reference: A Brentanian Distinction 120; Mark Textor: From Mental Holism to the Soul and Back 133-154.

  6. "Special Symposum: New Work on Brentano." 2023. European Journal of Philosophy no. 31:337-523.

    Contents: Guillaume Fréchette and Hamid Taieb: Descriptive psychology: Franz Brentano's project today 337; Charles Siewert: Why we need descriptive psychology 341; Johannes L. Brandl: Why we need descriptive psychology 358; Denis Seron: Experiencing the a priori 371; Anna Giustina: Introspective acquaintance: An integration account 380; Arnaud Dewalque: Introspective acquaintance: An integration account 398; Guillaume Fréchette: Why does it matter to individuate the senses: A Brentanian approach 413; Hamid Taieb: Brentano on the individuation of mental acts 431; Michelle Montague: Brentano's theory of intentionality 445-454.

    Book Symposium: Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value by Uriah Kriegel.

    Uriah Kriegel: Précis of Brentano's Philosophical System 445; Angela Mendelovici: Brentano on phenomenal and transitive consciousness, unconscious consciousness,and phenomenal intentionality 458; Jonas Olson: Kriegel on Brentano on value and fi ttingness 479; Uriah Kriegel: Brentano on consciousness, intentionality, value, will, and emotion: Reply tosymposiasts 486-493.

  7. Albertazzi, Liliana. 1989. "Brentano and Mauthner's Critique of Language." Brentano Studien no. 2:145-157.

    Abstract: "Though different in methodological approach to language, Brentano and Mauthner share a similar background: Positivism, Aristotelian studies, empiricist psychology, anti-Kantian stance. The critique of language marks the point of significant convergence: Brentano's emphasis of reism and nominalism goes together with (1) his descriptive-semasiologic critique of language as a logical doctrine of categories, and (2) his critique of language as a genetic semasiology, both bound by the view of the intentional nature of language. It is pointed out at lights that and how the component of genetic semasiology in Brentano allows comparison with the communicative, pragmatic and performative perspective of Mauthner's Sprachkritik due to a shared emphasis on the rhetorical force of language."

  8. ———. 1993. "Brentano, Twardowski, and Polish Scientific Philosophy." In Polish Scientific Philosophy: The Lvov-Warsaw School, edited by Coniglione, Franco, Poli, Roberto and Wolenski, Jan, 11-40. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

    "It is not an easy task to give a clear and brief summary of the thought of Franz Bentano, because of the shifting nature of its development and the complexity of its subject-matter. However, mention should be made of certain themes which constantly recur in his work: first, his Aristotelean inheritance(27) in particular his examination of the doctrine of the categories; second. his Cartesian choice of the evidence of inner perception of psychic phenomena, and his complementary notion of the mediated - and therefore not immediately evident - perception of outer perception, i.e. of physical phenomena. Third, his view of psychology as a discipline of high ontological value(28): a psychology of the act rather than of contents, and at the same a descriptive psychology or psychognosis(29). Brentano defined his descriptive psychology as an exact science and a pure psychology(30) seeking to analyse the elements of psychic life and the laws that govern it(31). This definition is particularly important because it gave rise to a whole series of taxonomies of psychic behaviour as variously developed in Husserlian phenomenology, Meinong's theory of objects, Marty's linguistic theories, Ehrenfcls' and Stumpf s school researches in Gestaltpsychologie." (pp. 13-14, notes abbreviated)

    (27) Brentano's thought is part of the Aristotelean Renaissance which was the work of the commentaries on Aristotle by Bonitz, Tricot and Schwegler, the Geschichle der Kategorienlehre by Trendelenburg, Prantl's history of logic and Steinthal's studies in linguistics, but it was also a result of the influence of Hegel. Brentano saw Aristotle as mediating between predominantly metaphysical interests and problems of theoretical psychology (...)

    (28) Note that although Brentano's original interest lay in metaphysics rather than in psychology, his descriptive psychology had considerable ontological valency. At Wiirzburg Brentano mainly taught metaphysics, history of philosophy and deductive and inductive logic; he only began lecturing in psychology in the summer of 1871. Cf. C. Stumpf, "Erinnerungen an Franz Brentano", in 0. Kraus. Franz Brentano. Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seine Lehre, mil Beiträgen v·on Carl Stumpf und Edmund Husserl, (Munich: Beck, 1919). (...)

    (29) The term 'descriptive' in the psychology and philosophy of this period embraces a variety of conceptions. One of the first to introduce the term 'descriptive' (beschreibend) in the sciences (in mathematics} was Kirchhoff. where be used it in contrast with 'explicative' (erklärend}. In Brentano. 'descriptive' (deskriptiv) has the specific meaning of 'morphological' merely classificatory. (...)

    (30) F. Brentano, Deskriptive Psychologie. (ed.} W. Baumgartner and R.M. Chisholm, (Hamburg: Meiner, 1928).

    (31) The fact that Brentano's descriptive psychology is a reine Psychologie demonstrates that it is essentially a theoretical science, entirely distinct from physiology.

  9. ———. 1993. "Brentano, Meinong and Husserl on Internal Time." Brentano Studien no. 3:89-110.

    Abstract: "Brentano's Descriptive Psychology marks a breakthrough into clarification of internal time, made possible by using his doctrine of intentionality (and modality) of consciousness. Husserl's version of descriptive psychology, a pure phenomenological psychology, according to its author tries to overcome Brentano's (naturalistic) description of internal experience by explicitly considering the intentional content of mental events, and the different categories of objects as objects of a possible consciousness. Husserl's investigations on internal time are an example of a quite specific sort of genetic inquiry, complementary to the descriptive one. Meinong, when discussing the relation of representation and perception of time, differentiates between the time as given in a representation (act time), in different sorts of (Meinongian) objects (object time), and in contents (content time). These questions of a Brentanist temporality problem are reconsidered and brought to a Husserlian conclusion."

  10. ———. 1998/9. "The phenomenon of time in Brentanist tradition." Brentano Studien no. 7:163-192.

  11. ———. 2003. "Franz Brentano's psychology today. A programme of empirical and experimental metaphysics." Brentano Studien no. 10:107-118.

    Abstract: "In this article I try to emphasise the following three main points:

    1. Brentano's metaphysics is not speculative; it is instead a programme for scientific research. 2. Some components of his metaphysics, especially those relating to the problem of perceptive continua -- and many aspects of it developed experimentally by his pupils -- are today discussed not only by philosophy but also by the cognitive sciences, more or less accurately, more or less consciously. 3. Some areas of the cognitive sciences express the need for a scientifically -- even neurophysiologically -- founded theory of intentionality."

  12. ———. 2004. "The Psychophysics of the soul. Aristote and Brentano." In Aristote au XIX siècle, edited by Thouard, Denis, 249-275. Villeneuve d'Asq Cédex: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.

    "Brentano’s studies on Aristotle are of a complexity such that they can be analysed along various dimensions:

    1. Environmental (specifically, the relationship between Brentano and the exponents of the Aristotelian revival, in particular Zeller, Prantl, Trendelenburg and Bonitz).

    2. Psychological (the connections between psychology and physiology, the problem of the intensity of the sensations and their measurement, the debate on intensive and extensive magnitudes, etc.).

    3. Metaphysical (in particular, the theme of being with regard to the categories and the relationship between being-in-potency and being-in-act, between accident and substance, and the problem of the continua).

    4. Logico-ontological (the theme of being with regard to true or false being, accidental being, etc.).

    These various dimensions are interconnected, so that analysis of Brentano’s writings furnishes a sort of ‘diorama’ on the Aristotelian themes .addressed by the nineteenth century’s Aristotelian Renaissance.

    This essay examines a number of aspects relative to psychology and, to some extent, metaphysics which distinguish not only the thought of Brentano but also that of his school - as regards both descriptive psychology and experimental psychology.

    Specifically, Brentano’s book The Psychology of Aristotle marks his shift of interest from metaphysical questions to problems of a gnoseological and psychological nature, although these latter are still presented in the form of commentary on, and interpretation of, Aristotle’s theories. The book acts as a prelude to Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint(9) Brentano best-known work, and it also marks the point at which Brentano’s interest turned to psychophysical questions.

    In this paper, after a brief overview of Aristotle’s theory of the soul (in particular of the sensitive soul) — which constitutes Brentano’s conceptual framework — I shall outline Brentano’s psychological theories. I shall then examine his specific conceptions, focusing on the difference between psychic phenomena and physical phenomena, and on the part/whole relation which characterizes the former. The Brentano texts to which I shall refer are The Psychology of Aristotle, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, and Descriptive Psychology." (pp. 249-250, notes omitted)

  13. ———. 2006. Immanent Realism: An Introduction to Brentano. Dordrecht: Springer.

    Contents: Acknowledgements IX; Terminological Note XI; Introduction 1; Chapter 1. A Life. A Novel 5; Chapter 2. Brentano and Aristotle 43; Chapter 3. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint 83; Chapter 4. Metaphysics and the Science of the Soul 123; Chapter 5. A woodworm in the Intentional Relation 155; Chapter 6. Ficciones 189; Chapter 7. Continua 233; Chapter 8. Reverse Aristotelianism: Metaphysics of Accidents 269; Chapter 9. Other Writings: Ethics, Aesthetics and History of Philosophy 295; Chapter 10. A History of Brentano Criticism 313; Chapter 11. A Wager on the Future 335; Bibliographic Notes 341; References 355; Index of Names 373-378.

    "This ‘Introduction to Brentano’ is primarily aimed at conceptual interpretation even though it has been written with scrupulous regard to the texts and sets out its topics according to their chronological development."

    (...)

    "This book is not an introduction to all the themes treated by Brentano, since this would be beyond its scope. Moreover, even less does it claim to be definitive.

    The idea of writing this introduction to the thought of Brentano sprang from a theoretical exigency, namely to argue for a more defendable form of realism, and from the conviction that, at the moment, a categorial apparatus able to handle the problems raised by contemporary science is lacking, in particular in cognitive science. The various forms of direct and indirect realisms are, in my opinion, inadequate to deal with the problems addressed by contemporary cognitive science. I believe, instead, that Brentano’s immanentist realism, with its sophisticated architecture, is a framework that can be applied and developed in various areas of scientific inquiry: for example, psychophysics and theory of perception, semantics, aesthetics, and more generally, the theory of consciousness (see L. Albertazzi ed., Unfolding Perceptual Continua, Amsterdam, Benjamins Publishing Company 2002). Brentano’s realism can oppose both the theory of Cartesian Theatre and the neuroreductionist proposal as well, and it is also a framework able to establish the scientific legitimacy of metaphysics (see L. Albertazzi ed., The Dawn of Cognitive Science. Early European Contributors, Dordrecht, Kluwer 2000). The book therefore pays close attention to Brentano’s writings on psychology and metaphysics.

    No reader of Brentano can fail to be astonished by the multiplicity of the disciplinary references to be found in his thought and writings. Consequently, although this introduction privileges themes of psychology and metaphysics, it also takes account of Brentano’s other writings, especially those on language." (pp. 1-2)

  14. ———. 2006. "Retrieving intentionality. A Legacy from the Brentano School." In The Lvov-Warsaw School: The New Generation, edited by Jadacki, Jacek Juliusz and Pasniczek, Jacek, 291-314. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

    "The expression ‘actus mentis’ then has a metaphysical connotation and as such constituted the basis of Franz Brentano’s theory of intentional reference, which became the standard source for subsequent and even contemporary citations on intentionality (Brentano 1874).

    Brentano, moreover, despite the widely held belief to the contrary, did not develop a thoroughgoing theory of intentionality, but rather one in only embryonic form, and especially in his unpublished writings. A thoroughgoing theory of intentionality, in fact, must fulfil a number of conditions, namely:

    (1) The moment-now of the intentional presentation must extend through a continuing set of durations which comprise fringes of the past and of the future contents.

    (2) Distinctions must be made among the various ways in which the psychic act is directed towards an object.

    (3) The relation between psychic act, object and content must be reconstructed, with a precise distinction being drawn between their distinctive parts.

    A modern version of a theory of intentionality of this type, which focuses on the relationship between act, object and content, has been developed in Poland by Twardowski, a pupil of Brentano. Twardowski’s theory was then resumed by Husserl with some modifications which accentuated the feature of temporal dynamicity.(2) Bearing these developments of Brentano’s theory in mind, the argument that I wish to develop below is the following:

    (1) Reference to a theory of intentionality is much more complex than the currently canonical versions employed by analytic philosophy.

    (2) It can serve the purposes of cognitive science and in particular the development of an empirical-experimental theory of cognitive space (see Albertazzi 2002)." (pp. 291-292)

    (Note 2) The first outline of a theory of intentionality, in fact, is to be found in an essay written by Husserl in 1894, Intentionale Gegenstände, in reply to a question raised by Twardowski in §§ 13 and 14 of his (1894). On this, see Schuhmann (1993), Albertazzi (1993).

    References

    Albertazzi, L. (1993). Brentano, Twardowski and Polish Scientific Philosophy. In: Coniglione et al., eds. (1993), pp. 11-40.

    Albertazzi, L. (2002). Towards a Neo-Aristotelian Theory of Continua: Elements of an Empirical Geometry. In: L. Albertazzi (ed.), Unfolding Perceptual Continua, pp. 29-79. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

    Brentano, F. (1874). Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte. Leipzig: Duncker & Humbolt. English translation: Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973).

    Coniglione, F., R. Poli and J. Wole?ski, eds. (1993). The Scientific Philosophy of the Lvov-Warsaw School. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 28. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

    Husserl, E. (1990/1). Intentionale Gegenstände. [1894] Edited by K. Schuhmann. Brentano Studien 3, 137-176. [English translation: Intentional objects, in Edmind Husserl, Early wWritings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1994, pp. 344-378]

    Schuhmann, K. (1993). Husserl and Twardowski. In: Coniglione et al., eds. (1993), pp. 41-58. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

    Twardowski, K. (1894). Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Edited by R. Haller. München-Wien: Philosophia Verlag, 1982. English translation: On the Content and Object of Presentations (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977).

  15. ———. 2018. "Brentano's Aristotelian Concept of Consciousness." In The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Consciousness, edited by Jacquette, Dale, 27-56. New York: Bloomsbury.

    "Developing a science of consciousness per se as proposed by Brentano (Brentano 1995b, 4–5) is a great endeavour and challenge for current research. In fact, starting from the analysis and description of conscious experience, one should re-define the qualities classically considered to be primary, such as the attributes of physics, like shapes, size, motion and the like, in the qualitative terms of ‘voluminousness’, ‘remoteness’, ‘solidness’, ‘squareness’ and so on, all of which are relational, distributed qualities of what is perceived. One has to bracket off the correlated psychophysical and/or neurophysiological inquiries and develop an autonomous science of qualities. For the time being, we still do not know how life emerged from an inanimate being, and we also do not know how consciousness arises from unconscious entities. We nevertheless have evidence of both. Moreover, we know at least some of the relations of dependence among the different levels of reality (Hartmann 1935; Poli 2001, 2012). It seems to be more productive and scientifically honest to recognize the existence of different realms, categorically different phenomena, governed by specific laws, and enjoying equal ontological dignity, instead of reducing all types of reality to the one we presently know better, or are supposed to know better, that is physical being. Future discoveries may allow us to know more about the complete nature of reality. Within this framework, consciousness is part and parcel of nature, and it is given to us phenomenologically or, as Brentano would have said, in phenomenal presence." (pp. 47-48)

    References

    Brentano, F. (1995b). Descriptive Psychology, edited by B. Müller, London: Routledge (1st German ed. 1982, edited by R. M. Chisholm and W. Baumgartner, Hamburg: Meiner).

    Hartmann, N. (1935). Ontologie (4 Vols), I: Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie, Berlin-Leipzig: de Gruyter. [English translation: Ontology: Laying the Foundations, Berlin: de Gruyter 2019]

    Poli, R. (2001). ‘The Basic Problem of the Theory of Levels of Reality’, Axiomathes, 12 (3–4), 261–83.

    Poli, R. (2012). ‘Nicolai Hartmann’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nicolai-hartmann

  16. Albertazzi, Liliana, Libardi, Massimo, and Poli, Roberto, eds. 1996. The School of Franz Brentano. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Analytical table of Contents IX; Foreword by The Editors XV; Introduction. Liliana Albertazzi, Massimo Libardi, Roberto Poli: Brentano and his School: reassembling the puzzle 1; 1. Massimo Libardi: Franz Brentano (1838-1917) 25; Part I: The pupils 81; 2. Liliana Albertazzi: Anton Marty (1847-1914) 83; 3. Karl Schuhmann: Carl Stumpf (1848-1936) 109; 4. Dale Jacquette: Alexius Meinong (1853-1920) 131; 5. Reinhard Fabian: Christian von Ehrenfels (1859-1932) 161; 6. Liliana Albertazzi: Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) 175; 7. Roberto Poli: Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938) 207; Part II: Topics and influences 233; 8. Wilhelm Baumgartner: Act, content and object 235; 9. Johannes Brandl: Intentionality 261; 10. Paolo Bozzi: Higher-order objects 285; 11. Peter Simons: Logic in the Brentano School 305; 12. Barry Smith: Logic and the Sachverhalt 323; 13. Roberto Poli: Truth theories 343; 14. Jan Wolenski: Reism in the Brentanist tradition 357: 15. Luigi Dappiano: Theories of values 377; 16. Liliana Albertazzi: From Kant to Brentano 423; Index of Topics 465; Index of names 467-477.

    "The central idea developed by the contributions to this book is that the split between analytic philosophy and phenomenology - perhaps the most important schism in twentieth-century philosophy - resulted from a radicalization of reciprocal partialities. Both schools of thought share, in fact, the same cultural background and their same initial stimulus in the thought of Franz Brentano. And one outcome of the subsequent rift between them was the oblivion into which the figure and thought of Brentano have fallen.

    The first step to take in remedying this split is to return to Brentano and to reconstruct the 'map' of Brentanism.

    The second task (which has been addressed by this book) is to revive interest in the theoretical complexity of Brentano's thought and of his pupils and to revitalize those aspects that have been neglected by subsequent debate within the various movements of Brentanian inspiration.

    We have accordingly decided to organize the book into two introductory essays followed by two sections (Parts 1 and 2) which systematically examine Brentano's thought and that of his followers. The two introductory essays reconstruct the reasons for the 'invisibility', so to speak, of Brentano and set out the essential features of his philosophical doctrine. Part 1 of the book then examines six of Brentano's most outstanding pupils (Marty, Stumpf, Meinong, Ehrenfels, Husserl and Twardowski). Part 2 contains nine essays concentrating on the principal topics addressed by the Brentanians.

    In order to facilitate cross-referencing between the various essays contained in the book, each chapter concludes with a table giving the other points in the book where the same topics are dealt with." (Foreword by the Editors).

  17. Alves, Pedor M. S. 2019/20. "The Not Always Conscious Mind. A Reappraisal of Brentano's Theses." Brentano Studien no. 16:195-226.

    Abstract: "In this article I discuss the three Brentanian theses of intentionality, self- consciousness, and the unity of consciousness. Regarding the first two, I argue that there is a shift in the meaning of consciousness when one passes from the first to the second, and I conclude that the best reading of self-consciousness is an intransitive one, opposing the strong transitive sense of the first thesis. Based on that, I examine whether there are non- conscious psychical acts or states . Disagreeing with Brentano, I present an empirical argument for the establishment of non-conscious psychical acts or states . Based on that, I construe the Brentanian thesis of the secondary object, presented by an intentio obliqua, as a process of time-constitution of the actuality of psychical, conscious life . Finally, I address the issue of unity of simultaneity of consciousness, presenting it in light of this new framework. Throughout the paper, especially in the first and last sections, I contrast the Aristotelian psyche-soma distinction with the modern mind- body dualism, trying to account for Brentano’s rather complex stance vis- à-vis one and the other."

  18. Antonelli, Mauro. 2003. "Franz Brentano, the "Grandfather of Phenomenology" and the Spirit of the Times." In Phenomenology World-Wide: Foundations - Expanding Dynamics - Life-Engagements. A Guide for Research and Study, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 11-29. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    "Brentano, teacher of Husserl

    In the literature on Husserl there is a marked tendency to interpret the thought of the founder of phenomenology in the light of his later works, particularly focusing on The Crisis of European Sciences, which deals with the fundamental concept of Lebenswelt, as well on the themes of passive synthesis and intersubjectivity, which were central concerns of this phase. Another dominant approach tends to view phenomenology purely in terms of transcendental phenomenology, a concept systematically developed in Ideas I of 1913, the text that most clearly reveals the closeness of Husserl to neo-Kantian movements.

    While undoubtedly legitimate, such approaches presuppose the presence of some immanent directive idea driving the development of Husserl's entire work and, in so doing, tend to impose corresponding directive criteria for its comprehension and interpretation. They therefore underplay the slow and complex evolution of the founder of phenomenology, the conceptual work to which he submitted his early ideas, and his continual effort to give them more precise definition and radically greater depth.

    This is even more true in considering the initial phase of Husserl 's work, which preceded and paved the way for Logical Investigations, a phase when the influence of his teacher Franz Brentano was strong and decisive. The fact that it was later dismissed by Husserl himself as being "psychologistic", does not justify its removal or neglect.

    On the contrary, it must be evaluated historically in terms of the preparatory stage for the development of a line of thinking that would lead, through the above-mentioned work of conceptual clarification and investigation, to an increasingly precise definition of the sphere of action of phenomenology.

    In the light of such remarks, we intend to review some of the crucial points along the philosophical itinerary traveled by Brentano, the man whom Husserl considered "my one and only teacher in philosophy" and from whose lessons the then youthful mathematician "first acquired ... the conviction that philosophy, too, is a field of serious endeavor, and that it too can-and in fact must-be dealt in rigorous scientific manner". (Husserl, 1919, 154; translation, 48)

    The outstanding feature of Brentano's philosophical propositions, which surfaces in the work of all his pupils, is the attribution of an essentially philosophical value to psychological investigation, which is in tum the basis for the revival and renewal of philosophy as a scientific discipline, whose crisis he imputes to the abandonment of the empirical method of research and the surrender to the speculative temptations typifying idealistic philosophy.

    It is in the singular blend of Aristotelian, Cartesian and Empiricist elements permeating this project that we uncover a series of decisive ideas which, critically perceived, were to influence profoundly the work of HusserI." (p. 11)

    References

    Husserl, E. 1919. "Erinnerungen an Franz Brentano", in Kraus: 1919, 153-167. Eng. trans. in McAlister: 1976, 47-55.

    Kraus, 0. (ed.) 1919. Franz Brentano. Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre. Miinchen: Beck.

    McAlister, L. L. (ed.) 1976. The Philosophy of Brentano. London: Duckworth.

  19. ———. 2015. "Franz Brentano’s Intentionality Thesis. A New Objection to the “Nonsense that was Dreamt up and Attributed to him”." Brentano Studien no. 13:23-53.

    Abstract: "Brentano’s thesis of intentionality has been traditionally interpreted as a theory of the “intentional relation”, i.e., of the (ordinary binary) relation between the mental act and its intentional or “immanent” object. This ob ject is immanent in the sense that it is in fact contained in the mind, and with an ontological status that is distinct from that of the transcendent, existent or non-existent object. On the basis of Brentano’s Aristotelian- Scholastic sources, especially Aristotle’s perception theory and his theory of relativa, the author rejects the view of the immanent object as a con- sciousness-immanent, ontologically diminished entity and highlights the continuity which exists between Brentano’s earlier and later (the so-called reistic) view of intentionality."

  20. ———. 2017. "In Search of Lost Substance. Brentano on Aristotle's Doctrine of Categories." Brentano Studien no. 15:173-228.

    Abstract: "Brentano’s doctoral dissertation 'On the Manifold Senses of Being in Aristotle' (1862) takes up Aristotle’s ontology and theory of categories in order to show that a realistic ontology requires the interweaving of factual being and its adequate logical expression. The scheme of categories manifests itself on a grammatical-linguistic level – as Trendelenburg pointed out – , but it is grounded in the variety and multiplicity characterising the level of real things – as Aquinas held. The logic-linguistic side of the categories is thus dependent on the ontological and founded by it. Brentano’s first book thus has two main interpretative sources, one which is fundamental but hidden, the other more explicit but superficial: the first is Thomas Aquinas – for Brentano as a young catholic seminarian, of course, 'sine Thomas mutus esset Aristoteles' – , the second Adolf Friedrich Trendelenburg, his Berlin teacher and leader of the Aristotelian revival in Protestant Germany. The Thomist influence lead Brentano to propose a univocal reading of the Aristotelian ontology, allowing that deduction of the categories from the general concept of being, that Aquinas had already worked out during the Middle Ages. Considering the Aristotelian ontological framework compatible with a deductive trend, which was aimed at bringing the equivocal nature of being back to an analogical structure, Brentano forced, at least partially, an interpretation that would be particularly appreciated by Heidegger, to the point that according to him it is due to Brentano that “the systematic impact of Aristotelian philosophy begins”. This Thomist influence is also analysed through a comparison between the printed version of the dissertation and its preliminary version, dating back to 1861, which is preserved as a manuscript in Brentano’s Nachlass (Werkmanuskripte, Frühe Schriften, Ms. 16)"

  21. ———. 2022. "Consciousness and Intentionality in Franz Brentano." Acta Analytica no. 37:301-322.

    Abstract: "The paper argues against the growing tendency to interpret Brentano’s conception of inner consciousness in self-representational terms. This trend has received support from the tendency to see Brentano as a forerunner of contemporary same-order theories of consciousness and from the view that Brentano models intransitive consciousness on transitive consciousness, such that a mental state is conscious insofar as it is aware of itself as an object. However, this reading fails to take into account the Brentanian concept of object, which is ultimately derived from ancient and medieval philosophy, as well as the secondary, elusive character that Brentano attributes to inner perception. According to Brentano, we have an aspectual but transparent consciousness of transcendent objects, whereas our awareness of our own mental acts is always complete but incidental, and ultimately opaque. Reversing the relationship between intentionality and consciousness faces difficulties at the textual interpretative level, but also raises theoretical problems, for it risks treating Brentano’s theory of mind as a form of subjectivism and idealism."

  22. Antonelli, Mauro, and Binder, Thomas, eds. 2021. The Philosophy of Brentano: Contributions from the Second International Conference Graz 1977 & 2017, in Memory of Rudolf Haller. Leiden: Brill Rodopi.

    Contents: Mauro Antonelli and Thomas Binder: Editors’ Introduction 1; Mauro Antonelli: In Memory of Rudolf Haller (1929–2014) 7;

    Part 1: Brentano’s Philosophical Program

    Wolfgang Huemer: Was Brentano a Systematic Philosopher? 11; Denis Fisette: Remarks on the Architecture of Brentano’s Philosophical Program 28; Susan Krantz Gabriel: Brentano on Kant’s Transcendental Idealism 50;

    Part 2: Ontology

    Werner Sauer: Beobachtungen zur Deduktion der Kategorien in Brentanos Dissertation 73; Laurent Cesalli: Medieval and Austro-German Realisms: Universals and States of Affairs 117;

    Part 3: Psychology

    Denis Seron: Psychology First! 141; Johannes L. Brandl and Mark Textor: ‘Disentangling Judgement from Its Linguistic Clothing’: Brentano’s View of Judgement and Its Linguistic Guises 156; Ion Tănăsescu: Franz Brentano and Anton Marty: Two Versions of Descriptive Psychology? 179; Hamid Taieb: Brentano on the Characteristics of Sensation 192; Bernhard M. Geißler: Der Einfluss Franz Brentanos auf Sigmund Freud: Der Versuch eines umfassenden ideengeschichtlichen Arguments 209;

    Part 4: Philosophy of Mind

    Mauro Antonelli: Selbst-Repräsentation und Phänomenale Intentionalität bei Brentano: Eine kritische Stellungnahme 231; Christiane Schreiber: Was versteht Brentano in der Intentionalitätspassage unter einem Objekt eines psychischen Phänomens? 250; Johann C. Marek: Brentano und Meinong: Versuch einer dokumentarischen Gegenüberstellung 263;

    Part 5: Logic, Ethics, Religion, and Politics

    Carlo Ierna: Brentano as a Logicist 301; Robin D. Rollinger: Brentano and von Ehrenfels on Emotion, Desire, and Absolute Value: An Extreme Contrast in Austrian Phenomenology 312; Klaus Hedwig: Die Transformation des Glaubens beim frühen Brentano 328; Adrian Maître: Zum psychologischen Gottesbeweis bei Franz Brentano 351; Thomas Binder: Eine politische Wissenschaft gibt es noch nicht: Einige Bemerkungen zu Franz Brentanos Verhältnis zur Politik 368;

    Index of Names 389-395.

  23. Antonelli, Mauro, and Boccaccini, Federico, eds. 2019. Franz Brentano: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers. Vol. 1: Sources and Legacy. New York: Routledge.

    Contents: Acknowledgements; General introduction; Introduction to volume 1

    Part 1. Brentano’s Life and Work

    1. Mario Puglisi, ‘Franz Brentano: A Biographical Sketch’, The American Journal of Psychology, 35, 3, 1924, 414–419.

    2. John Passmore, extract from ‘The Movement towards Objectivity’, in Hundred Years of Philosophy (London: Duckworth, 1957), pp. 175–181.

    3. Herbert Spiegelberg, ‘Franz Brentano (1838–1917): Forerunner of the Phenomenological Movement’, in The Phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction, (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960.

    Second revised edition 1978. Third expanded edition with the collaboration of Karl Schuhmann, 1982), pp. 27–50.

    Part 2. Brentano and Aristotle

    4. Rolf George and Glen Koehn, ‘Brentano’s Relation to Aristotle’, in D. Jacquette (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Brentano (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 20–44.

    First published in Grazer Philosophische Studien, 5, (1978) 197–210.

    5. John L. Ackrill, ‘Review of F. Brentano, The Psychology of Aristotle (in Particular His Doctrine of the Active Interest)’, Classical Review, 29, 1, 1979, 165.

    6. Barry Smith, ‘The Soul and Its Parts: A Study in Aristotle and Brentano’, Brentano Studien. Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung, 1, 1988, 75–88.

    7. Jonathan Barnes, ‘Review of F. Brentano, Über Aristoteles’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 49, 1, 1988, 162–167.

    8. Susan F. Krantz, ‘Brentano’s Argument Against Aristotle for the Immateriality of the Soul’, Brentano Studien. Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung, 1, 1988, 63–74.

    9. Mauro Antonelli, ‘In Search of Lost Substance: Brentano on Aristotle’s Doctrine of Categories’, revised and enlarged translation of ‘Auf der Suche nach der Substanz. Brentanos Stellung in der Rezeption der Aristotelischen Ontologie im 19. Jahrhundert’, Brentano Studien. Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung, 1990/91, 19–46.

    10. Richard Sorabji, ‘From Aristotle to Brentano: The Development of the Concept of Intentionality’, in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary Volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition, edited by H.

    Blumenthal & H. Robinson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 227– 259.

    11. Enrico Berti, ‘Brentano and Aristotle’s Metaphysics’, in R. W. Sharples (ed.), Whose Aristotle? Whose Aristotelianism? (Aldershot: Ashgate, 20011), pp. 135–149.

    12. Werner Sauer, ‘Being as the True: From Aristotle to Brentano’, in D. Fisette and G. Fréchette (eds.), Themes from Brentano, (Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi, 2013), pp. 193–226. Revised version by the author for the volume.

    Part 3. Brentano on Medieval and Modern Philosophy

    13. Herbert Spiegelberg, ‘"Intention" and "Intentionality" in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl’, in L. L. McAlister (ed.), The Philosophy of Brentano, (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp. 108–127. Originally published in Studia Philosophica, 29, 1970, 189-216.

    14. Etienne Gilson, ‘Franz Brentano’s Interpretation of Medieval Philosophy’, in L. L. McAlister (ed.), The Philosophy of Brentano, (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp. 56–67. Originally published in Mediaeval Studies, 1, 1, 1939, 1–10.

    15. Ausonio Marras, ‘Scholastic Roots of Brentano’s Conception of Intentionality’, in L. L. McAlister (ed.), The Philosophy of Brentano, (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp.128–139. Originally published in.Rassegna di Scienze Filosofiche, 1, 1974, 213–226.

    16. Richard Aquila, ‘Brentano, Descartes, and Hume on Awareness’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 35, 2, 1974, 223–239.

    17. Dieter Münch, ‘Brentano and Comte’, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 35, 1989, 33–54.

    Part 4. Legacy

    18. Carl Stumpf, ‘Reminiscences of Franz Brentano’, in L. L. McAlister (ed.), The Philosophy of Brentano, (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp.10–46. Originally published in O. Kraus (ed.), Franz Brentano. Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre, (Munich: Beck, 1919), pp. 85–149.

    19. Edmund Husserl, ‘Reminiscences of Franz Brentano’, in L. L. McAlister (ed.), The Philosophy of Brentano (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp. 47–55. Originally published in O. Kraus (ed.), Franz Brentano. Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre, (Munich: Beck, 1919), pp.151–167.

    20. Alexius Meinong, [‘Reminiscences of Franz Brentano’], extracts from ‘Meinong’s Life and Work’, in R. Grossmann Meinong (London: Routledge, 1974 [1921]), pp. 230–232.

    21. Martin Heidegger, ‘Letter to Richardson’, in W. J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963), pp. X–XI.

    22. John C. M. Brentano, ‘The Manuscripts of Franz Brentano’, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 20, 78, 1966, 477–482.

    23. Michael Dummett, ‘The Legacy of Brentano’, in Origins of Analytical Philosophy, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 28–42.

    24. Roderick M. Chisholm and Michael Corrado, ‘The Brentano-Vailati Correspondence’, Topoi, 1, 1982, 3–7.

    25. Barry Smith, ‘Austrian Philosophy and the Brentano School’, in Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano, (Chicago/La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1994), pp. 7–30.

    26. Dariusz Łukasiewicz, ‘Polish Metaphysics and the Brentanian Tradition’, in Sandra Lapointe, Jan Wolenski, Mathieu Marion and Wioletta Miskiewicz (eds), The Golden Age of Polish Philosophy: Kazimierz Twardowski's Philosophical Legacy (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2009), pp. 19-31.

  24. ———, eds. 2019. Franz Brentano: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers. Vol. 2: Intentionality and Philosophy of Mind. New York: Routledge.

    Contents: M. Antonelli, F. Boccaccini: Introduction to volume 2;

    Part 5. Psychology

    27. Robert Flint, ‘Review of F. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt’, Mind, 1, 1, 1876, 116–122.

    28, Théodule Ribot, ‘Brentano’, in German Psychology of Today: The Empirical School, translated from the second French edition by J. M. Baldwin, (New York: Schribner, 1886), pp. 295–300.

    29. William James, ‘On Brentano’, extract in The Principles of Psychology (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London, England: Harvard University Press, 1981 [1980]), vol. 1, pp. 185-191.

    30. George F. Stout, ‘On Brentano', extracts from Analytic Psychology, vol. 1 (London/New York: Mcmillan & Co., 1896), pp. 40–42; pp. 106–111; pp. 116–120.

    31. H. T. Watt, ‘Review of F. Brentano, Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie’, Mind, 17, 65, 1908, pp. 128–129.

    32. Paul Natorp, ‘Brentano’, trans. R. D. Rollinger, in Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode (Tübingen: Mohr, 1912), pp. 241–245.

    33. Martin Heidegger, ‘Review of F. Brentano, Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene (1914)’, trans. R. D. Rollinger, Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland, 40, 5, 1914, 233–234.

    34. Edward B. Titchener, ‘Brentano and Wundt: Empirical and Experimental Psychology’, American Journal of Psychology, 32, 1, 1921, 108–120.

    35. Edward B. Titchener, ‘Review of F. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt’, American Journal of Psychology, 36, 2, 1925, 303–304.

    36. Edwin G. Boring, ‘Franz Brentano’, in A History of Experimental Psychology (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1929/1950), pp. 356–361.

    37. Raymond E. Fancher, ‘Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint and Freud’s Early Metapsychology’, Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences, 13, 3, 1977, 207–227.

    38.Ernst Sosa, ‘Review of Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint III’, Canadian Philosophical Reviews/Revue Canadienne de Comptes Rendus en Philosophie, 4, 1, 1984, pp. 6–8.

    Part 6. Intentionality

    39. Alexius Meinong, ‘Object and Content’, in Marie-Luise Schubert Kalsi, Alexius Meinong on Objects of Higher Order and Husserl’s Phenomenology (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1978), pp.141–143.

    40. Edmund Husserl, ‘Appendix: External and Internal Perception: Physical and Physical Phenomena’, from Logical Investigations, translated by J.N. Findlay from the second German edition of Logische Untersuchungen; with a new preface by Michael Dummett; and edited with a new introduction by Dermot Moran, (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 335-348.

    41. Ludwig Wittgenstein, ‘Brentano’, in Gordon Backer (ed.), The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle (London: Routledge, 2003 [1930]), pp. 443–451.

    42. Roderick M. Chisholm, ‘Intentional Inexistence’, in L. L. McAlister (ed.), The Philosophy of Brentano, (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp. 140–150. Originally published in Perceiving: A Philosophical Study (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1957) pp. 168–185.

    43. Linda L. McAlister, ‘Chisholm and Brentano on Intentionality’, in L. L. McAlister (ed.), The Philosophy of Brentano, (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp.151–159. Originally published in Review of Metaphysics, 28, 2, 1975, 328–338.

    44. Dagfinn Føllesdal, ‘Brentano and Husserl on Intentional Objects and Perception’, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 5, 1978, 83–94.

    45. Roderick M. Chisholm, ‘The Formal Structure of the Intentional: A Metaphysical Study’, Brentano Studien. Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung, 3, 1990/91, 11–17.

    46. Dermot Moran, ‘Brentano’s Thesis’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 70, 1996, 1–27.

    47. Tim Crane, ‘Brentano’s Concept of Intentional Inexistence’, in M. Textor (ed.), The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy (London/New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 20–35.

    48. Guillaume Fréchette, ‘Brentano’s Thesis (Revisited)’, in D. Fisette and G. Fréchette (eds.), Themes from Brentano (Studien zur österreichischen Philosophie, vol. 44, (Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi, 2013), pp. 91–119.

    49. Mauro Antonelli, ‘Franz Brentano’s Intentionality Thesis. A New Objection to the "Nonsense that was Dreamt up and Attributed to Him"’, Brentano Studien. Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung, 13, 2015, 23–53.

    Part 7. Philosophy of Mind

    50. Max Scheler, ‘Illusion and Internal Perception’, extract from The Idols of Self-Knowledge in D. R. Lachterman (ed and trans.), Selected Philosophical Essays (Evanston, IL, Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 17-29. Translated from the German "Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis", in Vom Umsturz der Werte, 4 ed. rev., Gesammelte Werke III (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1955), pp. 215-292.

    51. Bertrand Russell, [‘Brentano’s Analysis of Mind’], extract in The Analysis of Mind, (London/New York: Allen & Unwin-Mcmillan, 1921), pp. 14–16; 142–143, 246-247.

    52. Charles W. Morris, ‘Mind as Intentional Act. Brentano and the Historical Background’, in Six Theories of Mind (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1932), pp.149–152.

    53. Reinhardt Grossmann, ‘Acts and Relations in Brentano’, Analysis, 21, 1, 1960/61, 1–5.

    54. Reinhard Kamitz, ‘Acts and Relations in Brentano: A Reply to Prof. Grossmann’, Analysis, 22, 4, 1961/62, 73–78.

    55. Jaegwon Kim, ‘Materialism and the Criteria of the Mental’, Synthese, 22, 3, 1971, 323–345.

    56. Elisabeth Anscombe, ‘Will and Emotion’, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 5, 1978, 139–148.

    57. Roderick M. Chisholm, ‘Brentano’s Analysis of the Consciousness of Time’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 6, 1, 1981, 3–16.

    58. Kevin Mulligan and Barry Smith, ‘Franz Brentano on the Ontology of Mind’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 45, 4, 1985, 627–644.

    59. David Bell, ‘Self-evidence, Self-knowledge, and Self-perception’, in Husserl, (London, Routledge, 1990), pp. 23–28.

    60. Roderick M. Chisholm, ‘Brentano on "Unconscious Consciousness"’, in R. Poli (ed.), Consciousness, Knowledge and Truth: Essays in Honour of Jan Srzednicki, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993), pp. 153–159.

    61. Amie L. Thomasson, ‘After Brentano: A One-Level Theory of Consciousness’, European Journal of Philosophy, 8, 2, 2000, 190–209.

    62. Uriah Kriegel, ‘Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 33, 1, 2003, 103–132, plus epilogue.

    63. Dan Zahavi, ‘Back to Brentano?’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11, 10–11, 2004, 66–87.

    64. Federico Boccaccini, ‘Brentano’s Use of Mental Act’ (original contribution for the volume).

  25. ———, eds. 2019. Franz Brentano: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers. Vol. 3: Metaphysics, Logic, Epistemology. New York: Routledge.

    Contents: M. Antonelli, F. Boccaccini: Introduction to volume 3;

    Part 8. Theory of Categories

    65. Oskar Kraus, ‘On Categories, Relations and Fictions’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 42, 1941/42, 101–116.

    66. Roderick M. Chisholm, ‘Brentano’s Conception of Substance and Accident’, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 5, 1978, 197–210.

    67. Andrew Burgess, ‘Review of F. Brentano, The Theory of Categories’, The Thomist, 48, 3, 1984, 493–497.

    68. Barry Smith, ‘The Substance of Brentano’s Ontology’, Topoi, 6, 1, 1987, 39–49.

    69. Peter M. Simons, ‘Brentano’s Theory of Categories: A Critical Appraisal’, Brentano Studien. Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung, 1, 1988, 47–61.

    Part 9. Reism

    70. Tadeusz Kotarbinski, ‘Franz Brentano as Reist’, trans. Linda L. McAlister and Margarete Schattle in L. L. McAlister (ed.), The Philosophy of Brentano, (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp. 194–203.

    Originally published as ‘Franz Brentano comme réiste’, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 20, 78, 1966, 459–476.

    71. D. B. Terrell, ‘Brentano’s Argument for Reismus’, in L. L. McAlister (ed.), The Philosophy of Brentano (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp. 204–212. Originally published in Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 20, 78, 1966, 446–458.

    72. Jan Wolenski, ‘Reism in the Brentanist Tradition’, in L. Albertazzi, M. Libardi and R. Poli (eds.), The School of Franz Brentano (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996), pp. 357–375.

    73. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski and Barry Smith, ‘Brentano’s Ontology: FromConceptualism to Reism’, in D. Jacquette (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Brentano (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 197–219.

    Part 10. Logic and Language

    74. Jan P. N. Land, ‘Brentano’s Logical Innovations’, Mind, 1, 2, 1876, 289–292.

    75. Wilhelm Windelband, ‘Contributions to the Theory of Negative Judgement’, trans. R. D. Rollinger, Strassburger Abhandlungen zur Philosophie. E. Zeller zu seinem 70. Geburtstag. (Freiburg i.Br./Tübingen, 1884), pp. 165-195.

    76. Martin Heidegger, ‘Judgement Characterised as a Basic Class of Psychical Phenomena (Franz Brentano, Anton Marty)’, trans. R. D. Rollinger, in Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus: Ein kritischpositiver

    Beitrag zur Logik (Leipzig: Barth, 1914), pp. 57–66.

    77. Hugo Bergmann, ‘Brentano’s Theory of Induction’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 5, 2, 1944/45, 281–292.

    78. Jan T. J. Srzednicki, ‘Some Elements of Brentano’s Analysis of Language and their Ramifications’, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 20, 78, 1966, 434–445.

    79. Peter Geach, ‘The Hume-Brentano-Gilson Thesis’, extract in Logic Matters (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972), pp. 263–267.

    80. Roderick M. Chisholm, ‘Brentano’s Theory of Judgement’, in Brentano and Meinong Studies, (Amsterdam/Atlanta: Rodopi, 1982), pp. 17–36.

    81. Peter M. Simons, ‘Brentano’s Reform of Logic’, Topoi, 6, 1, 1987, 25–38.

    82. David Bell, ‘A Brentanian Philosophy of Arithmetic’, Brentano Studien. Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung, 2, 1989, 139–144.

    83. Marietje van der Schaar, ‘Brentano on Logic, Truth and Evidence’, Brentano Studien. Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung, 10, 2003, 113–142.

    Part 11. Epistemology

    8. Moritz Schlick, ‘On Evidence’, extracts in General Theory of Knowledge, trans. by A. E. Blumberg; with an introduction by A. E. Blumberg and H. Feigl, (New York: Springer, 1974 [1918]), pp. 39–44, 82–90, 147–161.

    845. Wolfgang Stegmüller, ‘Critical Empiricism: Franz Brentano’, trans. R. D. Rollinger in Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie 1 ed. (Wien/Stuttgart: Humboldt-Verlag, 1952), pp. 45–88.

    86. Stephan Körner, ‘On Brentano’s Objections to Kant’s Theory of Knowledge’, Topoi, 6, 1, 1987, 11–17.

    87. Jan Wolenski, ‘Brentano’s Criticism of the Correspondence Conception of Truth and Tarski’s Semantic Theory’, Topoi, 8, 1, 1989, 105–110.

  26. ———, eds. 2019. Franz Brentano: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers. Vol. 4: Ethics, Aesthetics, Religion. New York: Routledge.

    Contents: M. Antonelli, F. Boccaccini: Introduction to volume 4;

    Part 12. Ethics and Value Theory

    88. George E. Moore, ‘Review of F. Brentano, The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong’, International Journal of Ethics, 14, 1, 1903, 115–123.

    89. George E. Moore, ‘Preface’, in Principia Ethica (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1960 [1903]), pp. vii-xii.

    90. Max Scheler, ‘The Non-Formal A Priori in Ethics’, in Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values. A New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism, translated from the German 5 ed. rev., Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1966) by M. S. Frings and R. L. Funk, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973 [1916]), pp. 81–91.

    91. Howard O. Eaton, ‘Brentano’s Empirical Psychology’, in The Austrian Philosophy of Values (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press,1930), pp. 15–39.

    92. William D. Ross, ‘Brentano and the Foundations of Ethics’, extract in Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939), pp. 279–283.

    93. Everett W. Hall, ‘Is Value the Being an Object or a Right Love?’, extract in What is Value? An Essay in Philosophical Analysis (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952), pp. 94–112.

    94. John N. Findlay, ‘Review of F. Brentano, Grunlegung und Aufbau der Ethik’, The Philosophical Review, 63, 3, 1954, 432–435.

    95. Gabriel Franks, ‘Was G. E. Moore Mistaken About Brentano?’, in L. L. McAlister (ed.), The Philosophy of Brentano (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp.182–193. Originally published in The New Scholasticism,

    43, 2, 1969, 252–268.

    96. John N. Findlay, ‘Brentano and the Axiological Ethics’, extract in Axiological Ethics, (London: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 16–24.

    97. Linda L. McAlister, ‘The Development of Brentano’s Later Ethical Theory’, in The Development of Franz Brentano’s Ethics (Elementa, vol. 27), (Amsterdam/Atlanta: Rodopi, 1982), pp. 141–167.

    98. Roderick M. Chisholm, ‘Correct Emotion’, in Brentano and Intrinsic Value (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 47–58.

    99. Roderick M. Chisholm, ‘The Hierarchy of Values’, in Brentano and Intrinsic Value (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 59–67.

    100. Sven Danielsson and Jonas Olson, ‘Brentano and the Buck-Passers’, Mind, 116, 463, 2007, 511–522.

    Part 13. Aesthetics, History, Religion

    101. Mario Puglisi, ‘Wisdom and Religion According to Franz Brentano’, The Personalist, 16, 1935, 68–72.

    102. George Katkov, ‘The Pleasant and the Beautiful’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 40, 1939/40, 177–206.

    103. Roderick M. Chisholm, ‘Review of F. Brentano, Religion und Philosophie’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 16, 3, 1955/56, 439– 440.

    104. Rush Rhees, ‘Review of F. Brentano, Religion und Philosophie’, Mind, 66, 262, 1957, 274–276.

    105. Hugo Bergman, ‘Brentano on the History of Greek Philosophy’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 26, 1, 1965, 94–99.

    106. Andrew J. Burgess, ‘Brentano as Philosopher of Religion’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 5, 2, 1974, 79–90.

    107. Andrew J. Burgess, ‘Brentano’s Evolving God’, The New Scholasticism, 55, 1, 1981, 438–449.

    108. Roderick M. Chisholm, ‘Brentano’s Theory of Pleasure and Pain’, Topoi, 6, 1, 1987, 59–64.

    109. Lynn Pasquerella, ‘Brentano and Aesthetic Intentions’, Brentano Studien. Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung, 4, 1992/93, 235–249.

    110. Rudolf Haller, ‘Remarks on Brentano’s Aesthetics’, trans R. D. Rollinger, in Brentano Studien. Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung, 5, 1994, 177–186.

    111. Eberhard Tiefensee, ‘Philosopy and Religion in the Work of Franz Brentano’, trans. R. D. Rollinger, in E. Coreth, W. Ernst and E. Tiefensee (eds.), Von Gott reden in säkularer Gesellschaft, (Leipzig: Benno Verlag, 1996), pp. 175–195.

    112. Peter Simons, ‘The Four Phases of Philosophy: Brentano’s Theory and Austrian’s History’, The Monist, 83, 1, 2000, 68–88.

    113. Werner Sauer, ‘Erneuerung der Philosophia Perennis: Über die ersten vier Habilitationsthesen Brentanos’, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 58–59, 2000, 119–149.

    114. Susan F. Krantz Gabriel, ‘Brentano on Religion and Natural Theology’, in D. Jacquette (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Brentano (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 237–254.

    115. Richard Schaefer, ‘Infallibility and Intentionality: Franz Brentano’s Diagnosis of German Catholicism’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 68, 3, 2007, 477–499.

    Index.

  27. Aquila, Richard. 1974. "Brentano, Descartes, and Hume on Awareness." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 35:223-239.

    "In an important sense, however, Brentano's real significance - or at least his real historical significance - does not turn upon either of these issues. For suppose that we grant that sensory experiences are mental but nonintentional phenomena, and that linguistic events are intentional but nonmental phenomena. Even if both of these things are so, we would still need to draw a clear distinction between any mental event which is intentional and the object of that event. And we must insist with Brentano that, with the exception of some special cases, the object of any mental event could not itself be something mental. The major force, I believe, of Brentano's concern with intentionality does not lie merely in his concern for some general distinction between mental and nonmental phenomena, although such a distinction was naturally of importance to him. Of at least as great an importance is the distinction which Brentano requires that we draw, once we have acknowledged the intentionality of conscious ness, between mental phenomena and, whether they be a "reality" or not, the objects of such phenomena. The object of ordinary sensory awareness, for example, is never in any literal sense something which has a merely mental status, not even in cases where that object is the sheerest of illusions or hallucinations. The object is, even in such cases as these, a purely physical phenomenon. The historical force of these points will become clear, I think, once we have set them incontrast with a certain "classical" approach that has been taken to the problem of awareness. This approach is provided by what we may call the "content theory" of awareness. This is a theory which, as I shall point out later, was in fact broadly influential among Brentano's contemporaries in psychology." (pp. 224-225)

  28. ———. 1982. "Intentional objects and Kantian appearances." Philosophical Topics no. 12:9-37.

    "Fairly obviously, Kant's epistemology raises questions concerning the intentionality, or the "object-directed" character, of perception.

    It is, as one might therefore expect, fruitful to consider Kant's views in comparison with some of those of Franz Brentano. This, it turns out, is no mere exegetical device, for it is not unreasonable to suggest that precisely the originality of Kant's approach to perceptual awareness lies in his anticipation of a point of view characteristic of the later thinker.

    Brentano's thesis, for the purpose of this discussion, does not involve his claim that all psychological states are intrinsically object-directed. Kant in fact appears to reject that claim, for he appears to share with Husserl the view that mere "sensations" constitute an exception to it. The relevant Brentanian thesis may be stated by restricting our attention to those sensory states which, in the opinion of all parties, are object-directed, namely, ordinary perceptions, or Kantian (empirical) intuitions (as opposed to the mere "sensations" ingredient in those intuitions). The thesis concerns a particular sense in which each such state is, in its intrinsic character, an object-directed state. Each, namely, is object-directed in a way that is logically independent of the ascription of ontological status to any object of that state." (p. 9, notes omitted)

  29. Arnaud, Richard B. 1975. "Brentanist Relations." In Analysis and Metaphysics: Essays in Honor of R. M. Chisholm, edited by Lehrer, Keith, 189-208. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

    "A single passage from Franz Brentano's Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint has, in the century since its publication, spawned more than its share of mythological beasts, mathematical monsters and philosophical treatises. It runs:

    ... Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of of the Middle Ages called the intentional (and also mental) inexistence (Inexistenz) of an object (Gegenstand), and what we could call, although in not entirely unambiguous terms, the reference to a content, a direction upon an object (by which we are not to understand a reality in this case), or an immanent objectivity. Each one includes something as object within itself, although not always in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love [something is] loved, in hate [something] hated, in desire [something] desired, etc.

    This intentional inexistence is exclusively characteristic of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon manifests anything similar. Consequently, we can define mental phenomena by saying that they are such phenomena as include an object intentionally within themselves.(1)

    This passage sets forth, or at least strongly intimates, three doctrines that were to preoccupy Brentano and his followers in later years, namely: (I) the doctrine that intentionality, reference to an object, is a distinctive mark of the mental; (II) the doctrine that intentional reference radically differs from other, merely physical, relations primarily in virtue of the fact that mental phenomena may be directed not only upon objects that exist but even upon objects that do not exist; and (III) an obscure and problematic doctrine to the effect that any object of intentional reference thereby has a special ontological status called 'intentional inexistence". What has come to be called the intentionality thesis of Brentano is the conjunction of (I) and (II).(...)

    In what follows, we shall concentrate on some of the philosophical difficulties that seem to be connected with (II), and very little will be made of (I). Nothing will be said here concerning the unsatisfactory doctrine (III), since the problematic nature of the notion of intentional inexistence has been forcefully demonstrated by Chisholm.(3)" (p. 189), note 2 omitted)

    (1) Brentano [2], pp. 88-89.

    (3) cr. Chisholm [3], pp. 6-20; and [4), pp. 201-203. Compare McAlister [1].

    References

    Brentano, Franz [2] Psychology from an Empirical Standpunkt, transI. by Antos C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell, and Linda L. McAlister, Humanities Press, New York, 1973.

    Chisholm, Roderick M. [3] 'Brentano on Descriptive Psychology and the Intentional', in Phenomenology and Existentialism, ed. by Edward N. Lee and Maurice Mandelbaum, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1967.

    Chisholm, Roderick M. [4] 'Intentionality', in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Philosophy, editor-in-chief, Paul Edwards, Macmillan Co. and The Free Press, New York, 1967.

    McAlister, Linda L. 'Franz Brentano and Intentional Inexistence', Journal of the History of Philosophy 8 (1970), 423-430.

  30. Bacigalupo, Giuliano. 2018. "Towards a New Brentanian Theory of Judgment." Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 95:245-264.

    Abstract: "In the last few decades, the interest in Brentano’s philosophical psychology, especially in his theory of judgment, has been steadily growing. What, however, has remained relatively unexplored are the modifications that have been introduced over the years into this theory by Brentano himself and by his student Anton Marty. These amendments constitute the focus of the present paper. As will be argued, only by making such changes can the weaknesses of the first formulation of the theory be overcome.

    Moreover, as the final section of the paper attempts to show, these modifications may even trigger further steps towards what we might label a new Brentanian theory of judgment."

  31. Bartok, Philip J. 2005. "Brentano's Intentionality Thesis: beyond the analytic and phenomenological readings." Journal of History of Philosophy no. 43:437-460.

    "The task of this paper is to navigate a route between the excesses of these two influential readings of Brentano’s thesis [the analytical and the phenomenological]. By attending closely to both the motivating concerns and the distinctive methodological features of Brentano’s psychology,

    as it is presented in PES [Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint] and in the posthumously published lectures on Descriptive Psychology (DP), this reading aims to avoid both the methodological insensitivity of the analytic reading and the Whiggishness of the phenomenological reading while preserving what is of value in each. The picture of Brentano that emerges from such an investigation is that of an innovating founder of a new empirical psychology, a psychology that was to serve as the foundation not only for metaphysics, but also for fields like logic, ethics, and aesthetics. While this psychology bears significant methodological and doctrinal similarities to both contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and phenomenology, the attempt to identify its methods and concerns with those of either of these two successors occludes what is truly distinctive about it. An appreciation of the distinctive character of Brentano’s psychology permits a fairer reading of his intentionality thesis and thus allows for a more accurate assessment of the complex relationship of Brentano’s empirical psychology to the philosophical and psychological works of his twentieth-century successors on both sides of the Atlantic.(...)

    I shall proceed as follows: In section 1 I survey the “analytic reading” of Brentano’s thesis, drawing attention to its misunderstandings of the central Brentanian terms ‘phenomena’ and ‘intentional inexistence’ as well as its general insensitivity to Brentano’s psychological method. Section 2 introduces the “phenomenological reading” as an improvement upon the analytic reading, in that it attends to methodological issues, permitting distinctions to be drawn between descriptive psychological, genetic psychological, metascientific, and metaphysical elements in his work. Section 3 criticizes the tendency of phenomenologists to impute their own theoretical motives to Brentano and his psychological project.

    Finally, section 4 introduces the elements of a third reading of Brentano’s thesis and of the psychological project of PES and DP as a whole, one that takes seriously his claim to be an empirical psychologist intent upon erecting a new psychology upon solid theoretical foundations." (p. 439, a note omitted)

  32. ———. 2005. "Reading Brentano on the Intentionality of the Mental." In Intentionality: Past and Future, edited by Forrai, Gabor and Kampis, George, 15-24. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

    "Franz Brentano’s attempts to develop a new empirical psychology, as presented in works like Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint of 1874 (Brentano, 1955/1995a; hereafter in text as “PES”) and the later lectures posthumously published in Descriptive Psychology (Brentano, 1982; 1995b; hereafter in text as “DP”), stand at the historical point of departure of the two dominant traditions in twentieth-century philosophy, the analytic and phenomenological traditions. Prominent thinkers in both of these camps have identified Brentano’s psychological explorations as an inspiration for central aspects of their philosophical views. But thinkers in these two traditions have read Brentano’s psychology and his most important discovery, his intentionality thesis, in quite different ways. As a result, they have arrived at different interpretations of the same theoretical elements. This state of affairs raises puzzling questions: How can the work of a single philosopher have given rise to such variant readings? Do relevant texts equally support both these readings? To what extent did the philosophical projects of Brentano’s readers color their understanding of his thought? Have his readers in either of these traditions recovered anything like Brentano’s understanding of his psychological project and his intentionality thesis?

    I will argue that while both of these broad strategies for reading Brentano involve significant misrepresentations of his intentionality thesis, phenomenologists have generally read Brentano in a far more methodologically sensitive fashion than have his analytic interpreters. Because of this, the phenomenological reading corrects some of the more serious interpretive errors made by many of his analytic readers. My strategy will be to examine each of these readings in turn, beginning with the analytic reading. A brief concluding section summarizes the results of these examinations." (p. 15)