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Theory and History of Ontology by Raul Corazzon | e-mail: rc@ontology.co

 

Bibliography of Intercultural and Comparative Philosophy: O-Sid

Bibliography

  1. Olberding, Amy. 2009. "Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies." APA Newsletters no. 9:3.

    "In February of this year, the Committee on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies hosted a panel at the APA’s Central Division meeting in Chicago. The focus of the panel concerned the intersections of Asian philosophies and feminism. While the essays and commentary delivered for the panel reflected the specific academic research foci of our participants, there are of course many ways to understand how Asian philosophies and feminism intersect, or fail to intersect. Consequently, this section of the Newsletter aspires to expand on the discussions of our panel, as well as to explore additional territory. For it, some of our panel participants and several other scholars working in Asian philosophy reflect on a variety of related subjects. These include, for example, the search for affinities between feminist concerns and the concerns found in Asian materials; the state of the field of Asian philosophy as it pertains to incorporating feminist consciousness; the personal experiences of feminist scholars who seek to enliven their work with both historical sensitivity and feminist commitments; and the capacity of feminist readings of Asian philosophies to foster scholarly development and political progress. As the work presented here illustrates, there are many ways to frame and understand the import of feminism for Asian philosophies."

  2. Oldmeadow, Harry. 2007. "The Comparative Study of Eastern and Western Metaphysics: A Perennialist Perspective." Sophia no. 46:49-64.

    Abstract: "The comparative study of Eastern and Western philosophy has been hindered and/or distorted by Eurocentric assumptions about “philosophy”, especially the overvaluation of rationality as an instrument of knowledge. The widespread discounting of Eastern thought derives, in large measure, from the modern Western failure to understand the nature of the traditional metaphysics of both the Occident and the East. This failure can be remedied by recourse to the work of a group of “traditionalist” or “perennialist” thinkers who expose the limitations of many approaches to the comparative study of philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular."

  3. Ouyang, Min. 2012. "There is No Need for Zhongguo Zhexue to be Philosophy." Asian Philosophy no. 22:199-223.

    Abstract: "In this paper, I shall argue that philosophy proper is a Western cultural practice and cannot refer to traditional Chinese thinking unless in an analogical or metaphorical sense. Likewise, the Chinese idiom ‘Zhongguo zhexue’ has evolved its independent cultural meaning and has no need to be considered as philosophy in the Western academic sense. For the purpose of elucidating the culturally autonomous status of Zhongguo zhexue, as well as the possible counterparts of Western philosophy in other cultures, I contend that Davidsonian anomalous monism may provide a proper explanatory framework for the intercultural relationships between different ‘sophias’ from various traditions. As for the equivocal English term ‘Chinese philosophy’, I suggest replacing it with a more precise new word: ‘sinosophy’."

  4. Ouyang, Xiao. 2018. "Rethinking Comparative Philosophical Methodology: In Response to Weber's Criticism." Philosophy East and West no. 68:242-256.

    "Ralph Weber’s (2013, pp. 593–602) illuminating study of the recent works on “(meta-)methodology in comparative philosophy” shows that this trend has persisted well into contemporary studies and enhances its influence in the community —“all [authors] seem to rely to some degree on the presumption that comparative philosophy is best understood as ‘intercultural philosophy’.”(4) Weber argues, however, that this “contemporary dominance of cultures in comparative philosophy,” namely the “rely[ing] on cultures as [a] philosophically relevant pre-comparative tertium,” has been an “unwarranted assumption” and has caused problems concerning “reification” and “the effect of inclusionary exclusion.”(5) He therefore calls for a “(self-)critical engagement with comparative philosophy” with the help of his “analytical tool” of comparison, which consists of five variables that are “distinguished in standard conceptualizations,” namely “the comparer, the comparata, the pre-comparative tertium, the tertium comparationis, the result of the comparison.”(6)" (p. 244)

    (4) Weber’s use of the term “intercultural” and Moore’s preference “transcultural” are not essentially different. Both refer to interaction among multiple cultures.

    Another synonym is “cross-culture.” Therefore, in my argument I am using the terms interchangeably.

    (5) It can be understood as a kind of “two-edged sword.” Weber (2013, p. 601) thinks that “the same factors that allow scholars of these cultures to claim a niche for themselves within philosophy can be and are used by others to (dis)qualify that area of scholarship as being about something other than philosophy proper.”

    (6) Weber (2014, p. 162) defines the “tertium comparationis as the respect in which determined comparata are compared” and the “‘pre-comparative’ tertium” as “which is at work in the setting up of the comparison.”

    References

    Weber, Ralph. 2013. “‘How to Compare?’ — On the Methodological State of Comparative Philosophy.” Philosophy Compass 8, no. 7 : 593 — 603.

    ———. 2014. “Comparative Philosophy and the Tertium: Comparing What with What, and in What Respect?” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 12, no. 2 : 151–171.

  5. ———. 2018. "Rejoinder to Ralph Weber." Philosophy East and West no. 68:261-263.

    "Ralph Weber’s reply to my comment, as we have come to expect from his writing, is both well articulated and instructive. His clarification has helped me to further grasp the consideration that underpins his methodological criticism. I am also encouraged to find agreement on the worth of a historical study of comparative philosophy as an established sub-discipline. In addition, Weber’s attitude toward “disagreement” is thought-provoking. However, I would like to suggest that disagreement is positive and meaningful if and only if (1) it is not based on misunderstanding, and moreover if (2) disagreement itself should not be regarded as the purpose. The ideal intellectual exchange should be able to encompass both (1) the aim and endeavor to achieve a potential agreement, and (2) the possibility for an ongoing dialogue and disputation.

    In this spirit, I will now respond to some points raised by Weber in his reply to my comment." (p. 261)

  6. Pang-White, Ann A. 2009. "Chinese Philosophy and Woman: Is Reconciliation Possible?" APA Newsletters no. 9:3-4.

    "The choice of transcending the facticity of masculine discourse shouldn’t be limited to the Western canon but open to all, including Asian philosophy. One can dwell on the fact that most of what Confucius, Mencius, or Xunzi says has nothing to do with women’s liberation, or well-being per se, or one can choose to suspend that limitation and extract the relevance of the ideas of ren, reciprocity, and relationality to a more wholesome vision of human society where gender oppression is a historical past, not an ongoing struggle. Much of the prejudice against the incorporation of, or just a sheer neglect of, the relevance of Asian philosophy to feminism in the West has been centered on the explicit sexist references found in the tradition. But this facticity of masculine discourse is common to all traditions, be they East, West, North, or South, so my question would be this: Why selectively exclude non-Western canons in feminist discourse?" (p. 4)

  7. Panikkar, Raimundo. 1988. "What Is Comparative Philosophy Comparing?" In Interpreting Across Boundaries. New Essays in Comparative Philosophy, edited by Larson, Gerald James and Deutsch, Eliot, 116-136. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    "Comparative studies are still fashionable today because they belong to the thrust toward universalization characteristic of western culture. The West not being able any longer to dominate other peoples politically, it tries to maintain—most of the time unconsciously—a certain control by striving toward a global picture of the world by means of comparative studies.

    Yet, this very thrust toward homogenization and "global thinking" may boomerang into decentralization and pluralism once the wisdom of other cultures becomes better known.

    Paradoxically enough, comparative philosophy, which has an inbuilt trend to overcome the plurality of cosmo-visions, may end by legitimizing mutually irreconcilable systems and becoming the stronghold of pluralism.

    I shall offer a definition of comparative philosophy and argue that it is different from all other comparative studies by virtue of the subject matter under comparison. And this uniqueness finds its paradoxical expression in my thesis that, strictly speaking, comparative philosophy is an impossible independent discipline, which nevertheless thrives in the very recognition of its impossibility.(1)" (p. 116)

    (1) This is the thesis of my paper "Aporias in the Comparative Philosophy of Religion," Man and World 3-4 (1980): 357-383.

  8. Quintern, Detlev. 2017. "Beyond Cross-Cultural Philosophy: Towards a New Enlightenment." Philosophical Investigations (University of Tabriz-Iran) no. 11:191-204.

    Abstract: "The acculturalization of humanities from the late 1980ies onwards led not only to imagined different worlds (e.g. West / Islam), postmodernity overshad-owed also common grounds of world`s philosophies. Christianity and Islam share far more than what might separate them, and we find Islam in „the West “ as Christianity „in the East“. The Logos of Life Philosophy as developed by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (1923-2014) strives towards deciphering the deep layers of philosophy and its common grounds. Tracing back to Gnostic, Platonic (neo-platonic) and Islamic shaped philosophies - Ikhwan as-Safa will serve as an example - the Logos of Life / Aql Al-Kulli (universal reason) will be historicized in the following while introducing approaches towards a New Enlightenment (A.-T. Tymieniecka) as an alternative to the current crisis in meta-sciences."

  9. R'boul, Hamza. 2022. "Intercultural philosophy and internationalisation of higher education: epistemologies of the South, geopolitics of knowledge and epistemological polylogue." Journal of Further and Higher Education no. 46:1149-1160.

    Abstract: "The enduring colonial-like relations among Northern and Southern spaces continue to influence knowledge production and dissemination. Critical scholarship on epistemic diversity in higher education has argued that knowledge circulation is often unilateral considering how global partnerships among universities and higher education models are still unidirectional. While Northern ways of knowing dominate what is taught and researched in higher education institutions, indigenous knowledges are

    not always represented in their local universities due to skewed geopolitics of knowledges. That is why emerging forms of resistance such as the calls for decolonising the curriculum have emphasised the need to deconstruct the ideological systems of exclusion in contemporary higher education. This article discusses how the internationalisation of higher education may be running the risk of reproducing epistemic injustice and uneven geopolitics of knowledge. With the West-led internationalisation discourse and the ascendancy of neoliberal tendencies, universities in the Global South might be experiencing deeper epistemic dependency.

    To undermine the dominance of western epistemologies, less popular ways of knowing are expected to assume a central position in the global geopolitics of knowledge. This article makes a case for embracing intercultural philosophy as an emancipating framework that offers the possibility of reconciling the world’s epistemologies by promoting interepistemic dialogue. The nuance of intercultural philosophy and its analysis of the epistemic relationships at play granted by epistemological polylogue can encourage pluri-epistemologies in higher education."

  10. Radhakrisnan, Sarvepalli, and Raju, Poolla Tirupati, eds. 1960. Concept of Man: A Study in Comparative Philosophy. London: George Allen & Unwin.

    Contents: P. T. Raju: Prologue to the second edition 9; S. Radhakrishnan: Prefatory remarks 23; P. T. Raju; Introduction 29; I. John Wild: The Concept of Man in Greek Thought 56; II. A.J. Heschel: The Concept of Man in Jewish Thought 122; III. W. T. Chan: The Concept of Man in Chinese Thought 172; IV. P. T. Raju: The Concept of Man in Indian Thought 220; V. P. T. Raju: Comparisons and Reflections 320; VI. Ernst Benz: The Concept of Man in Christian Thought 394; VII. Ibrahim Madhour: The Concept of Man in Islamic Thought 452; VIII. M. B. Milin: The Concept of Man in Marxist Thought 476; IX. P. R. Raju; Epilogue 536; Index 540-546,

  11. Raju, Poolla Tirupati. 1947. "The Western and the Indian Philosophical Traditions." Philosophical Review no. 56:127-155.

    "Without entering further into the principles of comparative philosophy, we may adopt, as a modus operandi for the comparison of the two traditions, the comparisons of their origins, of their developments, and of their endings. Their origins are of the past and can no longer change.

    The endings, so far as we are concerned, are what they are in the present. In the future, the two traditions may blend ; and the future historian of philosophy may trace two origins for the philosophy of his time, just as European culture of the present traces its birth to both Greece and Rome. Or possibly the two traditions may continue without regard for each other, which is certainly not to be desired. And as the endings for us are what they are now, the modes of their respective developments are also of the past. A careful understanding of the two traditions in these three aspects should enable us to determine the individuality of each with respect to the other." (pp. 128-129)

  12. ———. 1955. "Idealisms: Eastern and Western." Philosophy East and West no. 5:211-234.

    "Since World War II, humanity has become world-conscious. People have come to realize that every part of the world is now more closely knit with every other part than before. Events which previously would have been considered to be only of national importance are now of international impor- tance. Even countries which are self-sufficient in every respect no longer think they can cut themselves off from the rest of the world. Great and rich nations are worried about the poverty of small nations. Economically and politically, the parts of the world have come closer and closer. But should they not also come close psychologically and reflectively? Or should we conclude that we are coming dangerously closer? Dangerously or help- fully, we are coming closer, and we have to spread the feeling of common humanity. We want mutual understanding of cultures; but cultures attain reflectiveness in their philosophies. So mutual understanding of cultures will be mere dilettantism without mutual understanding of philosophies. And mutual understanding of philosophies is not possible unless it is accepted that, essentially and in truth, man and his reason are the same everywhere. Hence the need for comparative philosophy, which will naturally lead to philosophies with broader outlook. Our sense of what is important will become truer." (p. 212)

  13. ———. 1957. "Being, Existence, Reality, and Truth." Philosophy East and West no. 17:291-315.

    "For philosophy the concepts of Being, Existence, Reality and Truth are very important, if not central; but no other concepts are more vague than they, and no other terms are more loosely used than theirs. For a student of comparative philosophy, the difficulty becomes all the greater in understanding them, because each is used in different senses by different philosophers and sometimes by the same philosopher in different places. Again, in some languages separate words are not found to mean the different concepts. Further, as will be shown in this paper, some of these words do not naturally express the meanings they are sought to express, and our understanding becomes vague and confused. Now that English is one of the languages for the intercommunication of philosophies and cultures, it is important to find out not only the distinct meanings of these words but also how English expresses these meanings clearly and naturally. And these words and concepts are of primary importance for philosophy in general and for comparative philosophy in particular, the study of which is being taken up seriously. Much confusion will be prevented if the meanings they can naturally express are delimited." (p. 291)

  14. ———. 1962. Introduction to Comparative Philosophy. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

    Reprint: Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1977.

    Contents: Preface V; General Introduction 3; 1. Western Philosophy and the Struggle for the Liberation of the Outward 13; 2. Chinese Philosophy and Human Mindfulness 93, 3. Indian Philosophy and Explication of Inwardness 169; 4. Comparisons and Reflections 249; Appendixes 337; Chronological Table 339; Glossary of Indian and Chinese Terms 352; Index 357.

  15. ———. 1963. "Comparative Philosophy and Spiritual Values: East and West." Philosophy East and West no. 13:211-225.

    "The tendency is strong to identify spiritual values with what we call intellectual, ethical, and aesthetic values, or Truth, Goodness, and Beauty.

    But, when the reality of spirit is rejected, these values must be considered as relevant only to the physical body or the biological principle. It is not realized that by denying the reality of spirit we destroy the very foundation of these values. For whom are these values meant and on what are they based? Our physico-chemical and biological nature is what it is, and there is no question of its becoming something different from what it is: it does not strive for the realization of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness. The originator of these values has, then, to be conceded to be spirit. But how are we to identify and locate it?" (p. 212)

  16. ———. 1970. Lectures in Comparative Philosophy. Poona: University of Poona.

    "For the meaning of " comparative philosophy " one should not go merely to its etymology and philology. Etymologically, the term may mean '' any philosophical work that compares " or " any philosophy that is developed by comparing any other philosophies. " In either case, the philosophies compared may be any two philosophies of the same tradition or even of the same period of that tradition, as for instance the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. But such work is not called comparative philosophy, although it is comparison of two philosophies. Without restricting and defining the meaning of the term, we lose its true significance and importance.

    Again, comparative philosophy is not a system of philosophy, just as comparative religion is not any established religion. But comparative philosophy may and ought to lead to a more comprehensive and adequate system of philosophy, just as comparative religion may and ought to produce a religious genius who can start a new and comprehensive and adequate religious outlook that meets the needs of modern man Comparative philosophy is a philosophical discipline and ought to be recognized as the most important philosophical activity of the present, in which the East and the West are both violently and non-violently merging with each other." (pp. 1-2)

  17. Ramose, Mogobe B. 2015. "On the contested meaning of ‘philosophy’." South African Journal of Philosophy no. 34:551-558.

    Abstract: "The thesis to be defended in this essay is that the meaning, and by implication the use, of philosophy continues to be contested. I will focus primarily on philosophy in South Africa in order to elucidate this thesis. In doing so, I will argue that the future of philosophy in South Africa lies precisely in the willingness to contest its meaning and use. Such a contestation must be in the form of a dialogue predicated on the principle of the equality of all human beings and the openness to learn from one another without precluding the possibility of change in oneself and the existential conditions that prevail. My starting point is that the present is the child of the past and the present in turn is the parent of the future. I will therefore look back with the view to arriving at the present that is the field of contestation."

  18. Raphals, Lisa. 1992. Knowing Words: Wisdom and Cunning in the Classical Traditions of China and Greece. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Foreword by Gregory Nagy.

  19. ———. 1994. "Skeptical Strategies in the "Zhuangzi" and "Theaetetus"." Philosophy East and West no. 44:501-526.

    "Both the Qi wu lun[*] and Theaetetus engage in extended discussions of the nature of knowing, language, explanation, perception, and perceptual judgment. Paul Woodruff asks a question about Plato that can also be applied to Zhuangzi: "Which came first, the sceptic or the epistemologist?" The epistemologist asks what knowledge is and how it can be acquired; the skeptic tries to detach her from that project. Zhuangzi, like Plato, may be doing something different from either of these, though it smacks of both.6 The Qi wu lun is the major consideration of epistemology in Warring States writings; the Theaetetus is the only Platonic dialogue devoted to a discussion of episteme, knowing. Yet we may observe that Zhuangzi never offers his own theory of knowing, and Socrates never reaches a definition of episteme. In this essay I compare several ostensibly skeptical elements in the Qi wu lun chapter of the Zhuangzi and the Theaetetus of Plato. I argue that the Zhuangzi and the Theaetetus use remarkably similar skeptical methods to explore epistemological problems in ways that are unique within their respective traditions.

    My purpose in making this case is twofold. One, I want to show that methods of argument in China and Greece may have more in common than we may be predisposed to suppose. Two, the comparison allows us to reexamine our own understanding of what skepticism is and does." (pp. 501-502)

    [*] The second chaptet of Zhuangzi.

    References

    Burnyeat, M. F., 1990. The Theaetetus of Plato with a Translation of Plato's Theaetetus by M. J. Levett. revised by Myles Burnyeat. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

    Graham, Angus C. trans. 1986. Chuang-tzu: The Inner Chapters. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981. Reprint, Unwin Paperbacks.

  20. ———. 2002. "Gender and Virtue in Greece and China." Journal of Chinese philosophy no. 29:415-436.

    "This article concerns a particular aspect of gendered virtue, namely, the claim that women “think differently than men”—more specifically, the claim that men and women differ in intellectual and ethical capacities, including capacities for moral reasoning and political and ethical judgment. Claims of this kind are legion. They are the property of no one culture or tradition, and have been used—across cultures—to deny political and civil rights to women by the imposition of an epistemological and ethical double standard.

    (...)

    Even feminists engage in this debate: some hold that gender predisposes women toward certain virtues, and men toward certain vices; others attack that position with equal vehemence.

    After a brief consideration of metaphorical and rhetorical uses of gender, I present two sets of gendered virtue controversies. The Greek arguments begin in Plato’s Republic and Laws, continue in Aristotle’s Politics, and resume in the European Enlightenment in the works of Rousseau and his critics. The Chinese arguments begin with the Analects of Confucius, reappear in Han dynastic histories, and continue in contemporary debates about Confucianism, feminism, and the status of women in contemporary Asian societies. These comparative controversies show that arguments about gendered virtue and debates about the relative ability of women and men to make intellectual and ethical judgments are not the property of any one “tradition,” Asian or Western, ancient or modern. In the final part of the article, I use these debates to consider some contemporary ramifications of the “Asian values” debate, including claims that Confucianism is “feminist,” or “more” or “differently” benign or feminist than Western philosophy." (pp. 415-416, notes omitted)

  21. Raud, Rein. 2006. "Philosophies versus Philosophy: In Defense of a Flexible Definition." Philosophy East and West no. 56:618-625.

    "It is strange that no one has taken up Carine Defoort’s clearly formulated and timely argument about the intercultural tensions in interpreting what philosophy is, although the issue deserves at least a roundtable, if not an international conference.(1)

    I doubt that this is because there is a general consensus that the matter is now settled, and I would therefore like to develop the argument a bit further and offer a few additional factors to consider. It is also obvious that the problem is not limited to the subject of Chinese philosophy alone: all traditions of thought from all over the world, but most notably the Indian, Islamic, and Japanese heritages, are affected by the positions we adopt. As in most debates about the commensurability of cultural traditions, we can find differences when we look for them, and similarities if these are what we would like to see, so the ‘‘conflict of sensitivities’’(2) is also a matter of attitudes.

    My own position is that regardless of what we prefer to call the practice of deeper thought (and ‘philosophy’ is a very good name), it would be extremely useful for all of its participants, whatever their origin and upbringing, to find a common denominator for them to be able to exchange ideas and mutually enrich each other on its basis. In what follows I shall try to sketch a perspective from which this could, in my opinion, be theoretically grounded." (p. 618)

    (1) Carine Defoort, ‘‘Is There Such a Thing as Chinese Philosophy? Arguments of an Implicit Debate,’’ Philosophy East and West 51 (3) (July 2001): 393–413.

    (2) Ibid., p. 406.

  22. Reding, Jean-Paul. 2004. Comparative Essays in Early Greek and Chinese Rational Thinking. Aldershot: Ashgate.

    "Comparing ancient Chinese to ancient Greek philosophical thinking is certainly a fascinating enterprise. But it is also a questionable one. What is the philosophical justification for such an undertaking? And why should we compare ancient Chinese to ancient Greek thought, rather than to Indian, Arabic or African ways of thinking? We might ask, further, if we have at our disposal a comparative method adaptable to a project of this scope.

    Let me begin by trying to answer the last question first. The comparative method is firmly established in the natural sciences, where we have a number of comparative disciplines, such as comparative zoology and comparative anatomy. Historical linguistics, comparative law, religious studies and comparative mythology also deserve to be mentioned in this context. Comparative philosophy, however, is rather ill famed, and has never acquired the status of a unified and independent philosophical discipline. Even the very notion of comparative philosophy as a discipline distinct from pure philosophy is rejected sometimes.

    Comparative philosophy is also seen very often as nothing more than a broader approach to the study of the history of philosophy, by including Indian, Chinese and African philosophies as appendices to standard histories of Western philosophy. The most common way of practising comparative philosophy, however, is to spot marked differences or similarities between specific doctrines or global attitudes of Western and Eastern philosophy. The goal I have set myself is to rehabilitate the comparative method as a more rigorous way of doing philosophy with a cross-cultural perspective." (Introduction, p. 1, notes omitted)

  23. Rein'l, Robert L. 1953. "Comparative Philosophy and Intellectual Tolerance." Philosophy East and West no. 2:333-339.

    "Comparative philosophy may be studied either for the purpose of determining the relations among the different systems, where the objects studied are the systems rather than the objects with which the systems profess to be concerned, or for the sake of obtaining wisdom. The second of these purposes implies the first, but only the second is philosophic inquiry in the fullest sense. In connection with the first, Mr. Kwee has indicated the necessity of approaching a philosophy through its historical and socio-cultural setting, and has suggested eight approaches to the problem of comparative philosophy in general.(1) To these an addition is suggested, not in the sense of another method, but as an attitude that is required by all these approaches. The attitude is tolerance, specifically a variety that might be called intellectual. One must be intellectually tolerant if one is to reach out beyond the boundaries of one's own culture, and even more tolerant if one is to pursue investigations of a comparative nature." (p. 333)

    (19 J. Kwee Swan Liat, "Methods of Comparative Philosophy," Philosophy East and West, I, No. 1 (April, 1951), 10-15. The eight approaches are: the philological, the historical, the comparative, the formal-evaluative, the psychological, the phenomenological, the sociological andanthropological, and the total-integrative." (p. 333)

  24. Rivera Berruz, Stephanie, and Kalmanson, Leah, eds. 2018. Comparative Studies in Asian and Latin American Philosophies: Cross-Cultural eories and Methodologies. London: Bloomsbury Academic.

    Contents: Acknowledgments VI; 1. Stephanie Rivera Berruz and Leah Kalmanson: Introduction 1;

    Part I Coloniality and Orientalism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

    2. Andrea J. Pitts: Occidentalism and Orientalism in the Late Writings of Antonio Caso 13; 3. Adriana Novoa: Indian Veil: Metaphysics of Racial Origins in the Americas 33; 4. Hernán G. H. Taboada (translated by Alba Lara Granero and Maria C. Vera): Search for the Orient in Creole America: Nineteenth Century and its Paths 71;

    Part II New Directions in Asian-Latin American Comparative Philosophy

    5. Allison B. Wolf: Breastfeeding in Between: A Lugonian Reading of Watsuji Tetsurō’s Rinrigaku 105; 6. Agustín Jacinto Zavala: Two Ideas of Education: Amano Teiyū and José Vasconcelos 129; 7. Sebastian Purcell: Confucius and the Aztecs on The Mean 155;

    Part III Comparative Philosophy from the Anti-colonial Perspective

    8. Susan E. Babbitt: Is Anarchy a False Hope? Latin American Revolutionaries Knew Dhamma and Saddha 175; 9. George Fourlas: The Ants and the Elephant: Martial Arts and Liberation Philosophy in the Americas 201; 10. Namrata Mitra: Legacies of Legitimacy and Resistance: Imperial and State Violence in South Asia and Latin America 217;

    Index 239-248.

  25. Rorty, Richard. 1991. "Philosophers, Novelists, and Intellectual Comparisons: Heidegger, Kundera, and Dickens." In Culture and Modernity: East-West Philosophics Perspectives, edited by Deutsch, Eliot, 3-20. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

    Also published in R. Rorty, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2: Essays on Heidegger and Others, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991, pp. 66-82.

    "When tolerance and comfortable togetherness become the watchwords of a society, one should no longer hope for world-historical greatness. If such greatness — radical difference from the past, a dazzlingly unimaginable future — is what one wants, ascetic priests like Plato, Heidegger, and SusIov will fill the bill. But if it is not, novelists like Cervantes, Dickens, and Kundera may suffice. The fact that philosophy as a genre is closely associated with the quest for such greatness — with the attempt to focus all one's thoughts into a single narrow beam and send them out beyond the bounds of all that has been previously thought — may help explain why it is among the philosophers of the West that contemporary Western self-hatred is most prevalent. It must be tempting for Africans and Asians — the principal victims of Western imperialism and racism — to see this self-hatred as about what the West deserves. But I would suggest that we take this self-hatred as just one more symptom of the old familiar quest for purity which runs through the annals of the ascetic priesthood in both East and West. If we set these annals to one side, we may have a better chance of finding something distinctive in the West which the East can use, and conversely." (p. 20)

  26. ———. 1996. "The Ambiguity of 'Rationality'." Constellations no. 3:73-83.

    Symposium on Critical Theory by David Hoy and Thomas McCarthy (Malden: Blackwell 1994).

    "It is tempting to describe Critical Theory as an American version of the Habermas-vs.-Foucault debate, a debate which has agitated Europe in the ten years since the publication of Habermas’s The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. It is also tempting to read it as a contribution to the debate over postmodernism which is presently agitating the American academy.

    But neither description is quite right." (p. 73)

    (...)

    "In his rejoinder to Hoy, Thomas McCarthy agrees that we need Foucauldian “critical histories of contingent regimes of rationality.” But he disagrees with Hoy on the question of “whether there is anything universal at all to say about reason, truth, objectivity, and the like, or rather anything that would not be too ‘thin’ to be of any use” (223). McCarthy thus lays out what I take to be the central issue of the book: namely, whether these traditional topics of philosophical debate are relevant to socio-political deliberation." (p. 73)

  27. Rosán, Laurence J. 1952. "A Key to Comparative Philosophy." Philosophy East and West no. 2:56-65.

    "The present writer therefore wishes to suggest that the key to comparative philosophy is not the contrast of cultures but rather the contrast of basic philosophical attitudes or types of philosophy. There are certain philosophical attitudes that appear again and again at widely separated points in space and in widely separated periods of time, each of which is logically consistent within itself but in fundamental conflict with each of the others. Much further study would be required to determine the exact number and nature of these attitudes. But for the purposes of this article and in order to demonstrate the significance and value of this conception, let me arbitrarily speak of three such fundamental attitudes, understanding that this number represents undoubtedly a great simplification, although not, I hope, a falsification. The following paragraphs, therefore, are not intended to convey any new factual knowledge but rather to clarify and integrate the field of comparative philosophy. The examples offered as illustrations of each particular philosophical attitude are not meant to be exhaustive but merely suggestive, so that the reader will be able to think of many others which could have been used. Perhaps in certain cases there may be some disagreement about the classification of a particular author, but this, I imagine, will not affect the general validity of my approach. Of course, many writers cannot be clearly classified inasmuch as they mingle elements of two or more attitudes within themselves; since this would imply real inconsistency, however, I believe that the greatest philosophers will be those most amenable to classification." (pp. 56-57)

  28. ———. 1961. "Are Comparisons between the East and the West Fruitful for Comparative Philosophy?" Philosophy East and West no. 11:239-243.

    "In an earlier issue there appeared an article entitled "A Key to Comparative Philosophy," by the present writer.(2)"

    (...)

    "This article evoked a comment, printed in the same issue, entitled "Keys to Comparative Philosophy," by the editor of this Journal, Charles A. Moore.(3) Moore made good criticisms of some particular aspects of the typology that I suggested, but he did not attack the conception itself."

    (...)

    "But the purpose of the present article is not polemical, though the foregoing paragraph may seem somewhat contentiously phrased. On the contrary, I take seriously Moore's conclusion that there are probably several very different interpretations of comparative philosophy. What I would like to examine now is the question: Why are there these different "keys" to comparative philosophy? And I would like to suggest-neither facetiously nor pedantically, however the words may seem to strike the reader-that the reason there are different approaches to the problem of comparative philosophy is simply that there are different philosophies to begin with, and that each type of philosophy will, very naturally, offer a solution to this particular problem that will be consistent with the rest of its metaphysical and ethical views. In other words, whereas in my previous article I attempted a "typology of philosophies" as the key to comparative philosophy, I am here accepting the fact that there are several such "keys," but suggesting that there is a necessary reason for the variety of these "keys" themselves. In short, there is a "typology of the solutions to the problem of comparative philosophy," and this typology may be similar or even parallel to the typology of the philosophies themselves." (pp. 239-240)

    (2) Philosophy East and West, Ibid., II, No. 1 (April, 1952), 56-65.

    (3) Ibid., pp. 76-78.

  29. Rosemont, Henry Jr. 2014. "Symposium: Does the Concept of »Truth« Have Value in the Pursuit of Cross-Cultural Philosophy?" Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies no. 1:150-217.

    Abstract: "The symposium »Does the Concept of >Truth< Have Value in the Pursuit of Cross-Cultural Philosophy?« hones on a methodological question which has deep implications on doing philosophy cross-culturally.

    Drawing on early Confucian writers, the anchor, Henry Rosemont, Jr., attempts to explain why he is skeptical of pat, affirmative answers to this question. His co-symposiasts James Maffie, John Maraldo, and Sonam Thakchoe follow his trail in working out multi-faceted views on truth from Mexican, Japanese Confucian, and Tibetan Buddhist perspectives respectively. As these positions substantiate, the aforementioned non-Anglo-European traditions seem to draw on an integrated view of thinking, feeling, and living a human life. For their practitioners, truth is less of a correspondence with a given external reality.

    In fact, it enables human beings to strike the right path in living good, social lives."

    H. Rosemont Jr., Introductory Statement 151;

    Responses;

    J. Maffie: Reflections on Henry Rosemont’s »Introductory Statement« 161; J. Maraldo: Truth is Truthfulness: The Japanese Concept of Makoto 168; S. Thakchoe: Tibetan Reflections on the Value of Truth in Cross-Cultural Philosophy 186; H. Rosemont, Jr.: Reply: Truth as Truthfulness 205-217.

  30. Rošker, Jana S. 2013. "Cross-Cultural Dialogues in Modernization Theory: the Impact of Western Philosophies Upon Modern Confucianism in East Asia." Dve domovini: razprave o izseljenstvu no. 37:85-91.

    Abstract: "As a major source of social values, Modern Confucian theory has assumed great significance amidst the proliferation of instrumental rationalities in contemporary China. This neo-conservative current is distinguished by a multifaceted attempt to revitalize traditional thought by means of new influences borrowed or derived from Western systems. It is defined by a search for a synthesis between "Western" and traditional Chinese thought, aiming to elaborate a new system of ideas and values suitable for the modern, globalized society."

  31. ———. 2015. "Two Models of Structural Epistemology: Russell and Zhang Dongsun." International Communication of Chinese Culture no. 2:109-121.

    Abstract: "Zhang Dongsun (1886–1973) who belongs to the leading Chinese philosophers of the twentieth century, has developed his own system of thought, based upon the so-called pan-structural epistemology according to which the external cause of our sensation is not a substance, but the structural order of the external world. In his Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (1919), Russell had proposed a similar idea. The present article is based upon a comparative analysis of both structural epistemology models and aims to determine the specific and unique features of Zhang’s theory, focusing upon the elements deriving from traditional Chinese thought. Although in his pluralistic epistemology Zhang rejected ‘substance’, he namely still considered the dualistic theories of idealism and materialism to be completely wrong. While elements of both approaches can be found in Zhang Dongsun’s model, it cannot be identified with either one of them."

  32. ———. 2015. "Intercultural Methodology in Researching Chinese Philosophy." Zhéxué yu wénhuà yuèkan no. 42:55-76.

    "In Western research on Chinese philosophy, the non-reflected use of a theoretical analysis, which is a result of specific (Western) historical processes and the related, typical organizational structure of societies, may prove to be a dangerous and misleading mechanism.

    Concepts and categories can namely not simply be transferred from one socio-cultural context into another.

    Thus, in current intercultural discourses, the debate on the philosophical dimensions of Chinese texts and their role in the context of Chinese thought has been developed increasingly successfully under the aegis of rediscovering and applying specific traditional Chinese methodological approaches, concepts and categories. Based on the awareness of the importance of such revival of classical Chinese philosophical methodologies, the present paper aims to clarify the difference between external (外在超越性) and internal (or immanent) transcendence (內在 超越性) and the difference between Cartesian dualistic models and binary categories (对立范畴).

    On this basis, the author provides a short evaluation of the application of analytical vs. hermeneutic methods in investigating classical Chinese texts and proposes an innovative mode of hermeneutics, which is based on the fusion of jingjies (境界融合), aiming to replace the controversial Western hermeneutical method, rooted in the concept of the fusion of horizons."

  33. ———. 2016. "Modern Confucianism and the Intercultural Exchange between China and Central-Eastern Europe." Taiwan Jurnal of East Asian Studies no. 13:127-146.

    Abstract: "The topical processes of modern identity-making within Central and Eastern Europe on the one hand, and China, on the other, are fundamentally results of different forms of cultural and economic transformation, conflict and harmonious social adjustments. The aim of the present paper is to expose the need to appreciate the role of culture not only as a background to, but also as a constitutive part of, economic dynamics. Thus, it assumes that any comparative analysis of the rise of transitional societies must deal with questions connected to respective value systems, i.e. of moral education, political authority, social solidarity, and religious beliefs.

    It is not coincidental that the recent rapid development of the P.R. China owes much to such crucial traditional virtues as social hierarchy, self-discipline, social harmony, strong families and a respect for education. In this context, the present article examines the revival of Confucian tradition in China. According to previous research results, traditional East European values were in many aspects closer to such virtues than traditional Western values, which focused heavily on the idea of individual autonomy. This paper follows the presumption that the Central and Eastern Europe could function as a cultural and axiological bridge

    between China and Western Europe."

  34. ———. 2019. "A Philosophical Relation Between Taiwan and Japan: Models of Dialectical Thought in Mou Zongsan´s and Nishida Kitaro´s Theories." Asian Philosophy no. 29:333-350.

    Abstract: "The article opens with a discussion of recent theoretical and methodological innovations in the field of comparative philosophy. In this regard, I propose and explain a new possible method of contrasting particular aspects of divergent philosophical texts or discourses and denote it as a ‘philosophy of sublation’. Then, the paper provides a concrete example for such a post-comparative method of reasoning, I will try to apply a ‘sublation philosophy’ approach for a reinterpretation of certain aspects of the complex philosophical intersections between modern Japanese and Chinese philosophies through the lens of a contrastive analysis of Nishida Kitarō’s and Mou Zongsan’s dialectical thought. In this way, I hope to shed some new light upon some general questions regarding different models of dialectics."

  35. ———. 2019. "Li Zehou and his Rocky Relationship with Marx: Class Struggle as a form of Kantian Transcendental Illusion." Asian Studies no. 7:201-215.

    Abstract: "The present paper deals with Li Zehou’s contributions to the discussions of Marxism in the second half of the 20th century. In Li’s philosophy, Marx’s theories were reshaped, modified, and upgraded in a theoretical framework that differed from the original. He agreed with Marx’s presumption that the making and using of tools was the basic material practice, which made human evolution possible. Nevertheless, he saw Marx’s further development of this theory as problematic, because he saw it as being one-sided: progress from the means of production to the relations of production, and then on to the superstructure, only concerned the external developments of the relation between the manufacture and use of tools. At this point, Li was more interested in their internal influences, i.e., in the ways in which the making and use of tools has reshaped the human mind. He was highly sceptical of Marxist economic theories and criticized the crucial concepts elaborated by Marx in his through the lens of Kantian “transcendental illusions.”

    Proceeding from his combination of Marx and Kant, the present paper will critically analyse some crucial differences between the Marxian idea of the class struggle as a driving force of social progress, and Li’s own version of historical materialism."

  36. ———. 2020. "Chinese Philosophy, ˝Postcomparative˝ Approaches and Transcultural Studies: A Reply to Vytis Silius." Asian Studies no. 8:305-316.

    "In the previous issue of Asian Studies (May 2020), Vytis Silius published a paper entitled Diversifying Academic Philosophy: The Post-Comparative Turn and Transculturalism, in which he dealt with some basic, significant and hitherto still unsolved questions regarding the so-called “post-comparative shift” in Chinese and intercultural philosophy (see Silius 2020). The paper is well written, topical and very relevant. In spite (or all the more because) of the fact that it contains some controversial issues, it represents an important contribution to the present debates in the field. In this light, I would like to challenge the author (and his readers) by addressing the following issues, with which I aim to expose some of the minor problems contained in the paper on the one hand, but also propose some further general considerations of the delineated problems, on the other." (p. 305)

  37. ———. 2020. "Modern New Confucianism and the Challenges of Chinese Modernity: Intercultural Dialogues in Chinese philosophy." Culture and Dialogue no. 8:196-219.

    Abstract: "During the last decades of the previous century, the rebirth and the modernization of classical Confucianism gained increasing relevance. These tendencies have manifested themselves in a clearest and most influential way in the current of Modern New Confucianism. The representatives of this stream of thought aimed to elaborate upon a new ethical model of specifically Chinese modernity based upon traditional values that could in a renewed form meet the requirements of the new era. They aimed to

    preserve Chinese cultural identity while at the same time making their own original contributions to the development of a philosophical and theoretical dialogue between Euro-American and Chinese cultures. In this context, it is important to ask the question

    whether a model of modernization that is rooted in traditional Confucianism is truly capable of generating a non-individualistic version of modernity. Following this supposition, and focusing upon the works of the so-called “Second Generation” of Modern New Confucianism, this article aims to demonstrate that the alleged relation between modernity and individualism, which was almost exclusively seen as selfevident and undeniable by the Western modernization theories, is actually a result of Western historical paradigms."

  38. ———. 2021. Interpreting Chinese Philosophy: A New Methodology. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.

    "Since this book is written mainly for Western readers, it automatically deals with its subject through the lens of cultural differences.

    When reading Chinese philosophy, readers born, educated, and socialized in Western languages and social environments are confronted with different epistemologies, different perspectives, perceptions, and patterns of knowledge acquisition and transmission. To a certain extent, and especially when it comes to ancient and traditional philosophies, this problem also affects today’s Chinese readers who live in a globalized world where the standards of conception and understanding have been adopted from Western cultures.

    Therefore, our approach to Chinese philosophy is intercultural in the sense of interaction and engagement of several cultures. Interculturality is a specific type of interaction or communication between discourses, where differences in cultures play a role in the formation of meaning." (p. 13)

    (...)

    "In this book, the concept of culture is understood to be based on a metaphysics of relations. In this sense, I continue to use the two terms, that is, both intercultural and transcultural: although it is impossible to draw firm and constant boundaries between them because they form a complex and often overlapping web of meaning, I use the former when referring to concrete interactions between different cultures(7) and their various elements, and the latter when referring to the goal and results of such interactions, that is, to see oneself in the other." (p. 14)

    (7) Eric Nelson (2020, 249) even believes that concept of the “intercultural” is better described as the interaction of lifeworlds instead of cultures.

    References

    Nelson, Eric. 2020. “Intercultural Philosophy and Intercultural Hermeneutics: A Response to Defoort, Wenning, and Marchal.” Philosophy East & West 70(1): 247–59.

  39. ———. 2021. "Intercultural Methodology in Sinology: Transculturality, Textual Criticism and Discursive Translations." Acta Universitatis Carolinae. Philologica no. 3:135-151.

    Abstract: "For Western researchers, the understanding of Chinese culture is conditioned by differences in language, tradition, history and socialization.

    The interpretation of various aspects and elements of different cultures is always connected to the geographic, political and economic positions of the interpreter as well as the object of interpretation. In Western research on China, the non-reflected use of theoretical analyses that are in themselves results of specific (Western) historical processes and the related structure of societies, often proves to be a dangerous and misleading mechanism. A fundamental premise of the present paper is that Western epistemology represents only one of many different models of human comprehension of reality. On this basis, it questions traditional intercultural methodologies hitherto applied in Sinology and Chinese studies.

    The article presents the main methodological paradigms of a transculturally aware research that could improve the understanding of general principles underlying the particular research questions and objects under investigation."

  40. ———. 2021. "Intercultural Dialogues in Times of Global Pandemics: The Confucian Ethics of Relations and Social Organization in Sinic Societies." Ethics & Bioethics no. 11:206-216.

    Abstract: "Since COVID-19 is a global-scale pandemic, it can only be solved on the global level. In this context, intercultural dialogues are of utmost importance. Indeed, different models of traditional ethics might be of assistance in constructing a new, global ethics that could help us confront the present predicament and prepare for other possible global crises that might await us in the future. The explosive, pandemic spread of COVID-19 in 2020 clearly demonstrated that in general, one of the most effective tools for containment of the epidemics is precisely human and interpersonal solidarity, which must also be accompanied by a certain degree of autonomous self-discipline.

    The present paper follows the presumption that these types of personal and interpersonal attitudes are—inter alia— culturally conditioned and hence influenced by different traditional models of social ethics. In light of the fact that East-Asian or Sinic societies were more successful and effective in the process of containing and eliminating the virus compared to the strategies of the Euro-American regions, I will first question the widespread assumption that this effectiveness is linked to the authoritarian political traditions of the Sinic East and Southeast Asian areas.

    Then, I will critically introduce the Confucian ethics of relations, which in various ways has influenced the social structures of these regions, and clarify the question of whether and in which way the relics of this ethics had an actual effect on the crisis resolution measurements. The crucial aim of this paper is to contribute to the construction of theoretical groundworks for a new, transculturally grounded global ethics, which is more needed today than ever before."

  41. ———. 2021. "Kant, Confucianism, and "Global Rooted Philosophy" in Taiwan: from Mou Zongsan to Lee Ming-huei." Synthesis philosophica no. 36:217-128.

    "In Taiwan, the Confucian revival was always defined by the search for a synthesis between Western and traditional Confucian thought. Taiwanese Modern Confucians aimed to create a system of ideas and values capable of resolving modern, globalised societies’ social and political problems. Mou Zongsan, the best-known member of the second generation of Modern New Confucianism, aimed to revive the Chinese philosophical tradition through a dialogue with Modern European philosophy, especially with the works of Immanuel Kant. His follower Lee Ming-huei is arguably the most renowned expert on Kantian philosophy in the entire Sinitic region. The present paper aims to compare their respective approaches and evaluate them in a broader context of modern Chinese thought. I will first introduce Mou Zongsan’s elaborations on Kant. In the following, I will present the main aspects of Lee Ming-huei’s development of Mou’s theories and provide in later sections a critical assessment of Lee’s philosophical innovation, focusing upon the evaluation of his conceptualisation of immanent transcendence and Confucian deontology."

  42. ———. 2021. "Modernization of Confucian Ontology in Taiwan and Mainland China." Asian Philosophy no. 29:160-176.

    Abstract: "The present paper compares three models of modernized Confucian Ontology. The philosophers under debate belong to the most important, well-known and influential theoreticians in modern Taiwan and mainland China respectively. Through a contrastive analysis, the paper aims to critically introduce three alternative models of ontology, which have been developed from the Chinese philosophical tradition by the most well-known Taiwanese philosopher Mou Zongsan and by two most influential mainland Chinese theoreticians, Li Zehou and Chen Lai respectively. In this paper, I will analyze and critically introduce Li Zehou’s and Chen Lai’s respective critiques of Mou Zongsan’s basic assumptions that have been reflected in his methodological paradigms, while also exposing some major differences within their own lines of thought."

  43. ———. 2022. "Chinese and Global Philosophy: Postcomparative Transcultural Approaches and the Method of Sublation." Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy no. 21:165-182.

    Abstract: "The essay deals with problems encountered by Western researchers working in the field of Chinese philosophy. It begins with a discussion of intercultural and transcultural methodologies and illuminates some of the most common issues inherent in traditional intercultural comparisons in the field of philosophy. Taking into account the current state of the so-called postcomparative discourses in the field of transcultural philosophy and starting from the notion of culturally divergent frames of reference, it focuses upon semantic aspects of the Chinese philosophical tradition and exposes the need for discursive translations. On this basis, a new postcomparative approach in transcultural philosophical studies of Chinese philosophy is suggested. In this context, the author proposes the application of an innovative principle, based upon what can preliminary be denoted as the method of sublation."

  44. ———. 2022. "Sublating Sinic Relationism: On A Winding Path from Transcultural to Global Ethics." Asian Studies no. 10:81-104.

    Abstract: "This paper aims to bring into the global ethics debate concrete alternative models of specific relational ethics developed in the context of Sinic traditions that have not yet been widely introduced into Western scholarship or integrated into the framework of global discourses on ethics and morality. Although much research has been done on certain elements and aspects of such ethical models, there have been no concrete attempts to incorporate them into a global axiological framework that could have helped humanity develop strategies for solving the current global crises we face.

    The paper first provides a critical overview of the conceptual history, specific characteristics, and social relevance of relationism. It then addresses the question of how relational ethical models could be integrated into the value system of contemporary global ethics without reproducing the still dominant normativity of Western epistemology and its corresponding axiology. After highlighting some problems related to the methodology and structure of traditional models of comparative philosophy and ethics, the author suggests that this integration of relationism into the general framework of global ethics could be done by applying a new method, which can be tentatively called the method of transcultural philosophical sublation. Starting from different frames of reference that define the basic tenets of modern Western and traditional Chinese axiology, the author demonstrates the application of this method on the example of different conceptions of the human self."

  45. ———. 2022. "Comparing Logical Paradoxes through the Method of Sublation: Hui Shi, Zeno and the “Flying Arrow Problem"." Asian Studies no. 10:299-312.

    Abstract: "This article addresses some basic methodological problems in the field of transcultural post-comparative studies of ancient logic by comparing the famous flying arrow paradox of Hui Shi (370–c. 310 BCE) with an apparently similar paradox attributed to Zeno of Elea (495–430 BCE). The article proceeds from a general introduction to the basic framework of semantically determined classical Chinese logic, to an illumination of Hui Shi’s specific contributions to the field, and finally to a preliminary explanation that emerges from a contrastive analysis of Zeno’s and Hui Shi’s respective views on the problem of motion and stasis as manifested in their corresponding paradoxes. The contrastive analysis, based on an exposition of some basic problems in the field of transcultural methodology and a description of the so-called sublation method, points to the importance of considering different paradigms and frames of reference in identifying differences between apparently similar theses."

  46. Ross, Donald. 2019. Introduction to World Philosophy. London: Austin Macauley Publishers.

    "About the Book: What would it be like to go back in time and converse with the great sages of China, of India, of classical Greece and Rome, of the Christian and Islamic worlds, of Europeans of the Enlightenment? This book, Introduction to World Philosophy, aims to communicate some of the excitement and “mind-stretchingness” that such an encounter would produce. It is intended to to engage interested laypersons while remaining faithful to the standards of professional scholarship. It is written in an informal style yet does not talk down to the reader. Representatives from each of the five aforementioned periods are presented in pairs—one philosopher a more “head-in-the-clouds” thinker and the other a more “feet-on-the-ground” one. Besides demonstrating how each tradition offers a range of perspectives rather than a single, dominant one, such an approach achieves an optimum balance between breadth and depth. Ideas found in these texts range from mind-bending metaphysical speculation and the theory of knowledge, to questions of ethics and politics, to points of elementary logic. The whole discussion is prefaced by an extended exploration of what philosophy is. The author feels that it is important to reach out to the general public, to feed a genuine hunger out there for an accessible guide to the subject, and also acknowledge the relevance of non-Western, as well as Western, cultures to an increasingly globalized world."

  47. Scharfstein, Ben-Ami. 1998. A Comparative History of World Philosophy. From the Upanishads to Kant. Albany: State University of New York Press.

    Contents: Preface XI; Acknowledgments XIII; Chapter 1. The three philosophical traditions 1; Chapter 2. The beginnings of metaphysical philosophy Uddalaka, Yajnavalkya, Heraclitus, Parmenides 55; Chapter 3. The beginnings of moral philosophy Confucius/Mencius, the Buddha, Socrates 79; Chapter 4. Early logical relativism, skepticism, and absolutism Mahavira, Chuang-tzu, Protagoras, Gorgias, Plato 113; Chapter 5. Early rational Synthesis Hsün-tzu, Aristotle 145; Chapter 6. Early varieties of atomism Democritus/Epicurus/Lucretius, "Gautama"' and Nameless Buddhists 171; Chapter 7. Hierarchical idealism Plotinus/Proclus, Bhartrhari 205; Chapter 8. Developed skepticism Sextus Empiricus, Nagarjuna, Jayarashi, Shriharsha 233; Chapter 9. Religio-philosophical synthesis Udayana, Chu Hsi, Avicenna, Mairnonides, Aquinas 275; Chapter 10. Logic-sensitized, methodological metaphysics Gangesha, Descartes, Leibniz 329; Chapter 11. Immanent-transcendent holism Shankara, Spinoza 367, Chapter 12. Perceptual analysis, realistic and idealistic Asanga/Vasuhandu, Locke, Berkeley, Hume 407; Chapter 13. Fideistic neo-skepticism Dignaga/Dhamakirti, Kant 467; Afterword 517; Notes 531; Bibliography 655; Note on the Author 659; Index 661.

    From the Preface: "Because I hope that newcomers to the history of philosophy will be among the readers of this hook, I have taken care to explain whatever I think they need to know. The book begins with the reasons for studying philosophy comparatively and with the difficulties raised by such study, and it ends with a view of philosophy that is personal but that rests on all of the preceding discussion The philosophers dealt with represent certain attitudes. schools. and traditions, but they are remembered most interestingly and accurately as individuals. So even though I have had to omit a great deal and make schematic summaries, I have in each instance tried to suggest the philosopher's style, density, and order of thought. In its later chapters the book tends to grow more difficult and elaborate, like the philosophies it deals with; but the early chapters prepare for the later ones. and, whatever the difficulty, I have always wittiest as simply and clearly as I can.

    To avoid making a long book forbiddingly longer, I have limited not only the number of philosophers dealt with but also the range of thought by which each of them is represented Plato. for example, is limited to his theory of Ideas and Kant (except in the later discussion) to his Critique of Pure Reason. In keeping with the needs of a particular comparison. I have sometimes drawn a broad sketch and sometimes entered into details. When it has seemed natural. I have shared my own views with the reader-there is no good reason to pretend that I am a neutral, disembodied voice. But however I judge each philosopher's thought, I have committed myself to expound it with a minimum of bias." (p. XI)

  48. ———. 2001. "How important is truth to epistemology and knowledge? Some answers from comparative philosophy." Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge no. 15:275-283.

    "What can I say in a few pages to persuade someone with philosophical interests but without prior experience in comparative philosophy that he or she is living an unreasonably restricted intellectual life? With respect to the present subject, I’m sure that the senses, implications and varieties of such an inescapable conception as that of the usefulness of truth will be grasped in a richer, more mature way if the field of inquiry is broadened beyond contemporary Western philosophy.

    The so-called ‘primitives’ are the hardest to investigate for such a purpose because of their great variety, the uneven character of what evidence there is, and the fact that the presuppositions of their thought are of course not laid out and defended in treatises but remain for the most part implicit in their ways of life. I can do no better here than confine myself to a few hints, by way of examples that have for one reason or another interested me. I should add that I may refer to acts or attitudes in the present tense, though they may now be obsolete." (p. 276)

  49. Schepen, Renate, and Graness, Anke. 2019. "Heinz Kimmerle’s intercultural philosophy and the quest for epistemic justice." The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa no. 15:1-7.

    Abstract: "Since the 1990s epistemic (in)justice has been a central issue of post-colonial and feminist studies. But only during the last decade the term has become paradigmatic and new aspects of the issue have been addressed – particularly because of the works of De Sousa Santos (2012, 2014) and Fricker (2007). One of the pioneers of an intercultural approach to philosophy is the German philosopher Heinz Kimmerle (1930–2016), who in the 1980s began to focus his research on African philosophies. Intercultural philosophy aimed for more epistemic justice in the academy long before the term epistemic or cognitive injustice was coined and became a new paradigm in the social sciences and humanities. Kimmerle, for example, was one of the main proponents of a radical reform of the Eurocentric curricula in academic philosophy, and he called for the inclusion of philosophical traditions from various regions of the world. Similarities in the starting point of research and research questions in philosophy and post- or decolonial studies, and proposed solutions to epistemic injustice in these disciplines, give enough reason to combine the social sciences’ theories of epistemic justice with the methods of intercultural philosophy for a reciprocal cultural enrichment between these disciplines. This article shows that theories of ‘epistemic justice’ could benefit from Heinz Kimmerle’s method of dialogue and reflective listening. Similarly, insights derived from post-colonial, decolonial and feminist theory could strengthen an awareness of structural power inequalities in intercultural philosophy.

    Therefore, we explore how theories of epistemic justice and intercultural philosophy can complement each other."

    References

    Fricker, M., 2007, Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

    De Sousa Santos, B., 2012, ‘Public sphere and epistemologies of the south’, Africa Development 37(1), 43–67.

    De Sousa Santos, B., 2014, Epistemologies of the south: Justice Against Epistemicide, Routledge, New York.

  50. Schiltz, Elizabeth. 2014. "How to Teach Comparative Philosophy." Teaching Philosophy no. 37:215-231.

    Abstract: "This article articulates a range of possible pedagogical goals for courses in comparative philosophy, and discusses a number of methods and strategies for teaching courses intended to achieve those ends. Ultimately, it argues that the assignment to teach comparative philosophy represents an opportunity to design a course with remarkable freedom and tremendous potential. Comparative philosophy courses can engage students in unique ways that not only increase their understanding of the fundamental assumptions and beliefs of non-Western traditions, but also facilitate the development of the skills and dispositions that enable them to become better philosophers."

  51. Seaford, Richard. 2020. The Origins of Philosophy In Ancient Greece and Ancient India: A Historical Comparison. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    "This book is devoted to a unitary argument, but over such a wide range of material that I offer the reader preliminary guidance in this chapter, beginning with an overview.

    The next chapter (concluding Part A) presents explanations of the similarity between the earliest philosophy in India and Greece.

    Part B describes the polytheist reciprocity that, among an elite, was replaced in both cultures by monism. Part C centres on the main factors behind this replacement in India: the individual interiorisation of what I call the cosmic rite of passage, and monetisation. Part D describes the similar factors behind the similar development of ideas in Greece. The conclusion (Part E) summarises and explores the variety of factors behind the new imagining of universe and inner self." (from the Summary, p. 3)

  52. Selusi, Ambrogio. 2021. Chinese and Indian Ways of Thinking in Early Modern European Philosophy: Th e Reception and the Exclusion. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.

    "Th e purpose of this work is to examine the European understanding of China and India within the histories of philosophy from 1600 to 1744. The year 1600 is the publication of Barbaricae philosophiae antiquitatum by Otto van Heurn and 1744 the year of release of the last book of the Historia critica by Jakob Brucker, which was entitled ‘De Philosophia Exotica’. Heurn’s book is our terminus post quem, since in this work it was introduced for the first time in a ‘history of philosophy’ a chapter about modern or contemporary Indians, together with a chapter about ancient Indians.

    About Brucker, he provided a very long and detailed chapter on contemporary Asians in his widespread history of philosophy, while, after him, Asians were usually excluded from the histories of philosophy; that is the reason for choosing Brucker as our terminus ante quem. The two authors represent two opposite historiographical paradigms and the latter author openly rejected the method and the historical asset of the former. Therefore, we shall, on one side, investigate the description of these two Asian civilizations in a century and a half of ‘histories of philosophy’, on the other side, we shall try to understand the change of historiographical paradigms and appreciate the effects of these changes in the description of the two civilizations with which we are concerned" (p. 1)

  53. Senghass, Dieter. 2002. The Clash within Civilizations: Coming to terms with cultural conflicts. New York: Routledge.

    "Intercultural philosophy must face the realities of today’s world, particularly when in pursuit of politico-theoretical and socio-philosophical issues.

    This world is, however, completely different from the one that existed at the time when classical philosophy came into being. This is why all contemporary philosophies, and especially philosophies from non-European, non-Western cultures, must turn to the political, socioeconomic and cultural complexities emerging in their own environment.

    Such a confrontation will inevitably lead to differentiation processes which in the light of such historic changes it will be hard to confine to any form of cultural-essentialist straitjacket. It is this issue that creates such inner turmoil within cultures and their characteristic philosophical profiles; as a rule, it is hardly possible to reduce the many solutions put forward to a common denominator. Cultures, in the current, holistic sense of the word, and in the sense of civilizations, disintegrate, some earlier, some later; for some the process is slow, for others it is more accelerated; ultimately, however, this disintegration is irreversible.30" (p. 23, a note omitted)

  54. Shaner, David Edward, Nagatomo, Shigenori, and Yasuo, Yuasa. 1989. Science and Comparative Philosophy: Introducing Yuasa Yasuo. Leiden: Brill.

    "This book was written with a diverse group of readers in mind. We intended to serve the interests of both philosophers and scientists by introducing a broad conceptual framework in which different research methods can be shown to be mutually beneficial. An implicit theme running through the text is our belief that even an elementary understanding of complex patterns of human cognition and behavior requires that scholars employ several research strategies. Both scientific and phenomenological methods are constrained by their use of precisely defined—and therefore restrictive—sets of models, theories, laws, and patterns of explanation. Although these models, etc., constitute the pulars upon which sound research strategies are based, their employment requires embracing a _ diversity of assumptions. While these methodological assumptions give direction to different research programs, the exclusive use of any single research strategy can systematically distort and oversimplify the complex subject matter of studies focusing upon 'human nature'." (Preface, p. XVII)

  55. Shankman, Steven, and Durrant, Stephen W., eds. 2002. Early China/Ancient Greece: Thinking through Comparisons. Albany: State University of New York Press.

    Contents: Steven Shankman and Stephen W. Durrant: Introduction 1; 1. David L. Hall: What Has Athens to Do with Alexandria? or Why Sinologists Can’t Get Along with(out) Philosophers 15; 2. Haun Saussy: No Time Like the Present: The Category of Contemporaneity in Chinese Studies 35; 3. Michael Puett : Humans and Gods: The Theme of Self-Divinization in Early China and Early Greece 55; 4. Steven Shankman: “These Three Come Forth Together, But are Differently Named”: Laozi, Zhuangzi, Plato 75; 5. Roger T. Ames: Thinking through Comparisons: Analytical and Narrative Methods for Cultural Understanding 93; 6. C. H. Wang: Alluding to the Text, or the Context 111; 7. David N. Keightley: Epistemology in Cultural Context: Disguise and Deception in Early China and Early Greece 119; 8. David Schaberg: The Logic of Signs in Early Chinese Rhetoric 155; 9. Andrew Plaks: Means and Means: A Comparative Reading of Aristotle’s Ethics and the Zhongyong 187; 10. Lisa Raphals: Fatalism, Fate, and Stratagem in China and Greece 207; 11.Anthony C. Yu: Cratylus and Xunzi on Names 235; 12. Michael Nylan: Golden Spindles and Axes: Elite Women in the Archaemenid and Han Empires 251; 13. Stephen W. Durrant: Creating Tradition: Sima Qian Agonistes? 283; List of Contributors 299; Index 303-305.

  56. Sheldon, Wilmon H. 1956. "What Can Western Philosophy Contribute to Eastern?" Philosophy East and West no. 5:291-304.

    "Notice that we are here treating of philosophy as a distinct pursuit, not as a phase of cultural differences between East and West.

    True, indeed, the culture of a region, nation, race and its philosophy are deeply interwoven. But we are asking only what the individual philosophers as independent truthseekers of the Western arena can offer to the individual truthseekers of the East, giving them, if possible, truths in addition to what they already have. And if in the following we seem to dwell overlong on the weaknesses of Western thought, remember the old counsel: Set your own house in order first, then go out to help your neighbors." (p. 291)

  57. Shen, Vincent. 2003. "Some Thoughts on Intercultural Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy." Journal of Chinese Philosophy no. 30:357-372.

    "But what is an intercultural philosophy? This should not be limited to only doing comparative philosophy, as is in the cases of comparative religion, comparative linguistics, etc., which are often limited to the studies of resemblance and difference between different religions or languages. Although doing comparative philosophy in this manner could lead to a kind of relativism in philosophy, it could not really help the self/mutual understanding and practice of philosophy itself.

    For me, the real target of doing intercultural philosophy is therefore to put into contrast between, rather than sheer comparison of, different philosophical traditions. I understand “contrast” as the rhythmic and dialectical interplay between difference and complementarity, continuity and discontinuity, which leads eventually to the real mutual enrichment of different traditions in philosophy.(3)" (p. 358)

    (3) I have worked out a philosophy of contrast in my works, especially in my Essays in Contemporary Philosophy, (Taipei: Li-ming Publishing Company, 1985) and Contrast, Strangification and Dialogue (Taipei:Wunan, 2002).

  58. Shi'er, Ju. 2010. "The Cultural Relativity of Logic: From the Viewpoint of Ethnography and Historiography." Social Sciences in China no. 31:73-89.

    Abstract: "The concept of general argumentation has expanded the family of logic so that it incorporates the logic of other cultures besides modern culture. Based on reports of fieldwork among the Azande and the fruits of research on ancient Chinese logic and the logic of Buddhism, this paper attempts to provide a factual foundation for the proposition “the cultural relativity of logic” from a descriptive perspective. Adopting deductive argument as a meta-method, this paper argues for the existence of the cultural relativity of logic in modern culture and of the translated version of the logic of other cultures in modern culture. With the aid of ethnography and the historical research findings, we show that the logic of other cultures also has its own cultural relativity. We also seek to show through the concepts of language games and life forms that deductive argumentation as a meta-method likewise possesses cultural relativity."

  59. Siderits, Mark. 2017. "Comparison or Confluence In Philosophy?" In The Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy, edited by Ganeri, Jonardon, 75-92. New York: Oxford University Press.

    "Later chapters in this volume will focus on particular figures or texts important to the history of Indian philosophy, and explore their approach to a given philosophical issue. They thus convey important information about the Indian philosophical tradition. The present essay concerns one of the uses to which that information might be put. The question to be addressed here might be put in the following way. It is currently standard practice to include a component on the history of philosophy in the undergraduate philosophy curriculum. But what is included there is almost always exclusively Western. Suppose the history of the Indian philosophical tradition were studied at a degree of depth comparable to that given the Western tradition in the typical undergraduate curriculum. What would be the point? How might this be thought to contribute to the practice of philosophy?

    We think we know how to answer the comparable question when we are asked to defend the study of earlier periods of the Western tradition. The student working on the ontological status of abstract objects might, we think, benefit from knowing about the views of Plato, Aristotle, and Ockham on universals; work in meta-ethics would seem to require some knowledge of the varieties of ethical theories that have been proposed and worked out in the past; and so on. This explains why we are not shocked when Spinoza’s name is casually dropped into a discussion of the grounding problem—a problem that only began to be discussed a few decades ago. When we see the practice of philosophy as chiefly concerned with trying to solve unresolved philosophical problems, we can see why it might prove useful to know the genealogy of the problem and how related issues were addressed in the past." (p. 75)